الذاكرة السورية هي ملك لكل السوريين. يستند عملنا إلى المعايير العلمية، وينبغي أن تكون المعلومات دقيقة وموثوقة، وألّا تكتسي أيّ صبغة أيديولوجية. أرسلوا إلينا تعليقاتكم لإثراء المحتوى.أرسل ملاحظة

Brussels Summit Communiqué

We remain deeply concerned by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery and related materials, by states and non-state actors, which represents a growing threat to our populations, territory, and forces.  We condemn in the strongest possible terms the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria, as well as use in Iraq, Russia, Malaysia, and, for the first time since NATO’s foundation on Allied territory, the United Kingdom.  The use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, for any reason is unacceptable.  There can be no impunity for those who use chemical weapons.  We therefore welcome, as an important step towards accountability, the decision by the April 2021 Conference of the State Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to suspend Syria’s rights and privileges under the CWC.  We are determined to uphold the CWC and the global norm against the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and to hold those who use chemical weapons accountable for their actions, including through our joint commitment within the International Partnership Against the Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons.  We support the full implementation of the CWC and the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in addressing WMD threats and condemn those who seek to impede its work.  NATO remains committed to ensuring that Allies can protect their populations, forces, and territories against CBRN threats, including through reviewing NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Defending against CBRN Threats.  We are united in our resolve to promote the goals and objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.  We underline the need to bring the treaty into force and we support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, including the International Data Centre and International Monitoring System.  We call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with Conference on Disarmament report CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.  In the meantime, the Alliance calls on all states to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

50.         We remain committed to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security.  We are determined to preserve, strengthen, and modernise conventional arms control in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency, and host nation consent.  Russia’s continuing aggressive military posture, its refusal to fully comply with its obligations under the Treaty on Open Skies, its ongoing selective implementation of the Vienna Document, and its long-standing failure to implement the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, continue to undermine security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.  Allies call on Russia to return to full implementation of, and compliance with the letter and spirit of all of its international obligations and commitments, which is essential to rebuilding trust and confidence, military transparency and increasing predictability in the Euro-Atlantic region.  We specifically call on Russia to be open and transparent about its no-notice snap exercises, large-scale exercises and large-scale troop movements, in accordance with its Vienna Document commitments, particularly in light of its recent unprovoked and unjustified military build-up in and around Ukraine.  Allies underscore the importance of modernising the Vienna Document, and welcome the broad support for its comprehensive modernisation package.  We look forward to intensified discussions in the Forum for Security Cooperation leading to consensus on an updated Vienna Document at the 2021 OSCE Ministerial.  To maintain the contributions of the Treaty on Open Skies to the security of all State Parties, it is essential that all State Parties fully implement its provisions.  We will continue to actively support ongoing discussions at the OSCE, including the Structured Dialogue.  We call on Russia to engage constructively on all these efforts.

51.         We reiterate the Alliance’s full support to the goal of the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of North Korea, in accordance with relevant UNSCRs.  We call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to engage in meaningful negotiations with the United States towards achieving this goal.  We urge the DPRK to fully implement its international obligations; to eliminate its nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities and ballistic missiles; to return to the NPT and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and to abandon all related programmes.  We call on nations to fully implement existing UN sanctions.

52.         We are committed to ensuring that Iran will never develop a nuclear weapon.  We welcome the substantive discussions between Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) participants, and separately with the United States, to accomplish a mutual return to compliance with the JCPoA by the United States and Iran.  We support the goal of restoring the non-proliferation benefits of the JCPoA and of ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.  It is vital that Iran preserves the space for these discussions by avoiding any further escalation.  We strongly support the IAEA in its crucial monitoring and verification work to help ensure Iran’s compliance with the NPT-related safeguards obligations, as well as its other commitments.  A restored and fully implemented JCPoA could also pave the way to further address regional and security concerns, including in support of the non-proliferation regime.  We condemn Iran’s support to proxy forces and non-state armed actors, including through financing, training, and the proliferation of missile technology and weapons.  We call on Iran to stop all ballistic missile activities inconsistent with UNSCR 2231, refrain from destabilising actions, and play a constructive role in fostering regional stability and peace.

Syria retains an inventory of short-range ballistic missiles whose range covers parts of NATO’s territory and some of our partners’ territories.  Syria has used these missiles extensively against its own population.  We remain vigilant over missile launches from Syria which could again hit or target Turkey.  We continue to monitor and assess the ballistic missile threat from Syria.

The increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the vicinity of the south-eastern border of the Alliance has been, and remains a driver in NATO’s development and deployment of a ballistic missile defence system, which is configured to counter threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

53.         The conflict in Syria has entered its eleventh year and continues to have significant consequences on the stability of the region and the security of NATO’s south-eastern border.  We remain concerned and vigilant over its ramifications.  We reiterate our determination to defend NATO territory and borders against any threats and to address challenges emanating from Syria.  The presidential elections held on 26 May 2021 by the Syrian regime cannot be considered as free and fair and do not contribute to the efforts to achieve a political solution.  We underline that stability and security cannot be reinstated in Syria without a genuine political process in line with UNSCR 2254.  We call for a nationwide ceasefire and the reauthorisation and expansion of the UN cross-border humanitarian assistance for a period of at least 12 months in order to meet the needs of the Syrian people.  We reiterate our appreciation to our Ally Turkey for hosting millions of Syrian refugees.

المعلومات الأساسية

تاريخ الصدور

2021/06/14

iranDocument

لا

نوع الوثيقة

بيان ختامي

اللغة

الإنجليزية

كود الذاكرة السورية

SMI/A200/564029

وثائق أخرى للجهة المصدرة

Statement by the Chairman of the NATO-Russia Council on US-Russia framework for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons

نوع الوثيقة:

بيان

الجهة المصدرة:

حلف شمال الأطلسي - الناتو

تاريخ الصدور:

2013/09/17

NATO Secretary General Statement on North Atlantic Council Meeting on Syria

نوع الوثيقة:

محضر

الجهة المصدرة:

حلف شمال الأطلسي - الناتو

تاريخ الصدور:

2013/08/28

NATO Secretary General condemns reported chemical ‎weapons attack in Syria

نوع الوثيقة:

بيان

الجهة المصدرة:

حلف شمال الأطلسي - الناتو

تاريخ الصدور:

2017/04/05

NATO-Russia Council Statement of Support for the OPCW-UN Joint Mission

نوع الوثيقة:

بيان

الجهة المصدرة:

حلف شمال الأطلسي - الناتو

تاريخ الصدور:

2013/12/04

Warsaw Summit Communiqué

نوع الوثيقة:

بيان ختامي

الجهة المصدرة:

حلف شمال الأطلسي - الناتو

تاريخ الصدور:

2016/07/09

Statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on US strikes in Syria

نوع الوثيقة:

بيان عسكري

الجهة المصدرة:

حلف شمال الأطلسي - الناتو

تاريخ الصدور:

2017/04/07

Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Actions taken against the use of chemical weapons in Syria

نوع الوثيقة:

بيان

الجهة المصدرة:

حلف شمال الأطلسي - الناتو

تاريخ الصدور:

2018/04/14

Brussels Summit Declaration

نوع الوثيقة:

بيان ختامي

الجهة المصدرة:

حلف شمال الأطلسي - الناتو

تاريخ الصدور:

2018/07/11

Statement by the NATO Secretary General on the actions against the Syrian regime's chemical weapons facilities and capabilities

نوع الوثيقة:

بيان

الجهة المصدرة:

حلف شمال الأطلسي - الناتو

تاريخ الصدور:

2018/04/14

Wales Summit Declaration

نوع الوثيقة:

بيان ختامي

الجهة المصدرة:

حلف شمال الأطلسي - الناتو

تاريخ الصدور:

2014/09/05

كيانات متعلقة

شخصيات مرتبطة

لايوجد معلومات حالية

يوميات مرتبطة

لايوجد معلومات حالية

درجة الموثوقية:

الوثيقة

  • صحيحة
  • غير صحيحة
  • لم يتم التأكد من صحتها
  • غير محدد