THE MIDDLE EAST; Congressional Record Vol. 167, No. 106

<!-- -->

THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, now on another matter entirely, the

House of Representatives will vote today on a bill from Representative

Barbara Lee to repeal one of the key authorities behind nearly two

decades of U.S. efforts to fight terrorism: the 2002 authorization for

the use of military force. House Democrats claim this vote is an urgent

act of congressional oversight, and the Democratic leader has indicated

the Senate will take it up with similar zeal.

The right way to address ongoing terrorist threats is a debate

certainly worth having. I would have welcomed that debate before the

Biden administration began its hasty retreat from Afghanistan without a

plan to sustain counterterror missions or support our friends. It is

one we should have before we vote to repeal these authorities. Reality

is more complicated, more dangerous, and less politically convenient

than its supporters actually believe.

The fact is, the legal and practical application of the 2002 AUMF

extends far beyond the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime, and tossing

it aside without answering real questions about our ongoing efforts in

the region is reckless.

So let's clear up some facts. The 2002 AUMF has been understood for

years--years--to apply to a variety of threats emanating from Iraq.

Administrations of both parties have cited it as an important legal

foundation of our fight against ISIS. It has been used precisely

because the ISIS caliphate that stretched into Syria emanated from Iraq

after President Obama's withdrawal in 2011.

The 2002 AUMF is important in Iraq today because it provides

authority for U.S. forces there to defend themselves from a variety of

real, exigent threats. It is arguably even more important in Syria,

where our personnel are present against the wishes of the brutal Assad

regime, supporting local Kurdish and Arab forces and conducting strikes

against ISIS. And because ISIS and al-Qaida have sometimes diverged,

legal analysts have suggested that the 2001 AUMF alone may be

insufficient to authorize operations against ISIS.

Do supporters of this repeal fully understand the ways it might limit

counterterrorism missions? How about cyber ops? How about support for

Kurdish and Arab forces in Syria? How do they propose we respond to

growing attacks against our forces and interests in Iraq?

What about the prospects for robust congressional oversight if the

President is left to rely on unilateral article II authorities or even

less transparent ones? We are learning a lesson in real time about

withdrawing from Afghanistan without a plan. We shouldn't make the same

mistake here. So I suspect this isn't really about reasserting

congressional oversight. After all, when the last administration

announced plans to withdraw from Syria and Afghanistan in 2019, two

dozen Democrats joined my amendment opposing the decision and

reasserting our role in foreign policy. But now, many of our colleagues

no longer want to talk about what we should be doing to confront these

ongoing threats.

A lot can happen in 2 years, I guess. The political winds have

certainly changed. But one thing hasn't changed: The grave threats

posed by ISIS, al-Qaida, and other terrorist groups are as real as they

have ever been, and repealing AUMFs without agreeing on a set of new

authorities up front will only lead to more uncertainty about what we

are going to do about them.

For years, U.S. forces have been carefully handing more of the

primary responsibilities for counterterrorism to brave local partners.

Under the last administration, this allowed our military footprint in

Iraq and Syria to shrink dramatically. But the only reason that worked

is because our partners have been able to trust that the U.S. military

is still authorized to back them up. Today, House Democrats intend to

rip out one of the key authorities underpinning that trust.

As I understand it, Democrats don't even intend to stop there. They

are also planning to take aim at the 2001 authorities that allow us to

keep some of the most dangerous terrorists alive from taking more

innocent American lives. The administration says it is looking into how

best to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that

houses the absolute--absolute--worst of the worst, including Khalid

Shaikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the September 11 attack. But thus

far, the administration is rather short on details. How does the

President plan to do this? Does he intend to break the law and bring

terrorists to the United States? Give them expanded legal rights?

Further radicalize our prison population? Talk about domestic violent

extremism. Or does the President intend to send KSM and his

\\\[\\\[\[Page\](https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-167/senate-section/page/S4602) \[S4602\](https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-167/senate-section/page/S4602)\\\]\\\]

terrorist cronies to Pakistan or Saudi Arabia before they have faced

justice?

Closing Guantanamo Bay will not make Americans safer. It will not

bring solace to the victims of terrorism. It will not make America more

respected in the world. It won't solve the terrorist threat any more

than repealing AUMFs will end their war against us.

&nbsp;