TURKEY AND SYRIA; Congressional Record Vol. 165, No. 173

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TURKEY AND SYRIA

Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, now, on another matter, many of us

have been concerned for some time about the trajectory of our

strategically important NATO ally Turkey under the leadership of

President Erdogan.

Despite the hopes of the Obama administration and others that he

would be a model of Islamic democracy, Erdogan has instead used

democracy to work toward undemocratic ends. Freedom of the press,

secularism, and human rights have suffered under his rule, while

corruption has flourished. Opposition to Erdogan is growing, but the

political space for Turks to express their opposition is shrinking.

Obviously, in recent days, our concerns have centered on Turkey's

incursion into northeast Syria. We are angry about the damage Turkey

has caused for our local Kurdish partners in Syria.

I have spoken at length about my concerns on Turkey's incursion and

my opposition to withdrawing U.S. forces from Syria, but I believe we

need to be guided by our strategic interests, not emotions, as we seek

to contain the damage of Turkey's incursion, peel Ankara away from

Moscow, and encourage better behavior at home and abroad by Erdogan's

government.

I hope we will carefully consider all of our options to achieve these

important objectives and carefully examine whether a broad mandatory

sanctions bill is really the best solution.

We should think carefully about what specific effect we want

sanctions to have, how Turkey will respond to them, and how Russia or

others may exploit growing tensions between Washington and Ankara.

Before targeting an economy that is highly integrated with Europe's

economy, we should seek a better understanding of the specific economic

impact that broad sanctions will have on the global economy, on our

European partners, and on American workers and job creators. We should

reflect on whether we would be better off working in concert with

European allies to shape Turkey's behavior versus abruptly forcing

European companies to cut ties with Turkey through the threat of

sanctions.

Before using these kinds of policy tools--the kinds we use against

Iran and North Korea--against a democracy of 80 million people, we

should consider the political impact that blunt sanctions will have on

the Turkish people. Will sanctions rally them to our cause or to

Erdogan's? Would more targeted sanctions perhaps avoid some of these

unintended consequences? These are just some of the critical questions

I hope our committees of jurisdiction and the administration are able

to examine before we act.

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