SYRIAN DISPLACEMENT CRISIS; Congressional Record Vol. 161, No. 155

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SYRIAN DISPLACEMENT CRISIS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of

January 6, 2015, the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur) is recognized

for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as the Syrian displacement

crisis has consumed seven nations in the Middle East, among them

Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, obviously, and Syria itself, and has spawned

the largest refugee crisis Europe has faced since World War II.

The scope of the damage is incredible. This protracted conflict has

decimated Syria's infrastructure and has already taken the lives of

over 250,000 civilians, has displaced over 4 million people, and has

subjected tens upon thousands of children in that nation to Assad's

horrific barrel bombs. Most everyone who remains in Syria endures power

and water cuts, the threat of shelling, galloping inflation, and

rampant speculation about: What will happen next? Who will help us, the

innocents?

With roads often subject to ambush, freedom to travel has been

heavily curtailed. Checkpoints and concrete blast barriers have become

accepted adornments of daily life. Institutions such as schools,

hospitals, and offices remain open in government-held areas, though

many schools have become shelters for the legions of war injured and

homeless. Truly, it is grim. Often, classes are held in double shifts

to make room for the extra students. This is everyday life in Syria.

Five years into the conflict that has ravaged this once-modern

nation, more than half of the Syrian population is displaced, with over

4 million refugees in neighboring countries and tens of thousands

moving toward Europe. We see this on television every evening.

My hometown of Toledo has taken in 8 weary Syrian families--refugees

who have now again found hope in the liberty that America offers--but

fewer than 2,000 Syrians have come to the United States, though the war

has displaced more than 12 million since 2011. The free world simply

cannot allow this savage slaughter and dislocation to continue.

We ask ourselves: Where is the leadership for resolution?

{time} 1715

Now, in addition to daily airstrikes against civilians by the Syrian

Government violating international humanitarian law, Russian warplanes

are

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striking medical facilities and residential areas in non-ISIL areas

where rebel forces are fighting to overthrow the Assad regime while

Russia publicly proclaims its aim of eliminating ISIL targets.

I brought a map to the floor here that essentially shows most of

Syria, who holds it. If one looks at these red dots here, the Russian

planes are mainly bombing in the rebel-held areas, not in the ISIL-held

areas. So we see a complex situation that has developed on the ground.

As Putin moves with defiance to maintain the Syrian dictatorship, his

actions simply must be checked because it tells us that, in the future,

there will be more slaughter with what remains if those moderate forces

are not allowed to survive.

Since Russia began airstrikes at the end of September, at least 127

civilians, including 36 children and 34 women, have been killed by

Russian airstrikes, according to the opposition Syrian Observatory for

Human Rights.

For the sake of liberty in Syria, in Europe, and around the world,

America, NATO, the Transatlantic Alliance, and our allies in the Middle

East must lead the region to peaceful settlement.

I happen to represent a region in America where Syrian Americans have

lived for over a century. I can't even explain to you how they feel

about the total destruction of their homeland, its artifacts, and its

history. I am not even able to contain it in words here.

They came to see me last week, and they asked if I would read some of

their words into the Record, which I promised I would do this evening.

They want the American people and the world to know:

The biggest killer of civilians in Syria is the Assad

regime's use of barrel bombs. Packed with TNT and shrapnel,

these dumb bombs have no target and are just dropped from

helicopters on civilian neighborhoods. These bombs cause

massive destruction and casualties. Thousands upon thousands

of children have been killed and injured by these helicopter

flights.

And they said to me: Congresswoman, if you can say one thing to the

Congress and to those in Washington who can make a difference, please

tell them to disrupt and stop these helicopter flyovers. So the barrel

bombs aren't coming out of the F-16s obviously flying over Syria, but

they are coming from helicopters that the Assad regime is dispatching

across that country.

The most important step that can be done to save lives

would be the imposition of a no-fly zone. A no-fly zone will

turn the tide of war, and bring down the regime of terror and

force Assad to negotiate his exit.

We know there is resistance to that, but the world community must

meet this latest test in order to secure a better life for the people

that remain in Syria, those who may wish to return, and, obviously, the

millions that have fled and are in refugee camps throughout that region

and now as far as Western Europe.

I would urge the President of our country to consider the appointment

of a special envoy without portfolio for Syrian peace to work full-time

to bring all relevant nations together to resolve this unfolding

tragedy and aim at a civil military strategy for transition and

settlement.

I include for the Record Anthony Cordesman's writings.

\\\[From the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Oct. 1, 2015\\\]

The Long War in Syria: The Trees, the Forest, and All the King's Men

(By Anthony H. Cordesman)

Cliches are cliches, but sometimes it really is hard to see

the forest for the trees. In the case of Syria, the \\\`\\\`trees''

include the UN debate between Obama and Putin over Syria and

the fight against Islamic extremism, Russia's sudden military

intervention in Syria, the failure of the U.S. training and

assist missions in both Syria and Iraq, and the developing

scandal in USCENTCOM over exaggerated claims of success for

the U.S.-led air campaign in Syria and Iraq.

The most important \\\`\\\`tree,'' however, is trying to

negotiate an end to the fighting from the outside, as if

Assad was the key issue and as if it would be possible for

some diplomatic elite or mix of power brokers to bring Syria

back to some state of stability if only Assad would agree to

leave and the United States and Russia could agree on how to

approach the negotiations.

Focusing on the Trees When the Forest is Burning

The problem is that the \\\`\\\`forest'' is dying, burning, and

occupied by four broad sets of fighters that have little

reason to cooperate with any UN-led negotiating effort,

outside agreement over Assad--with or without U.S. and

Russian cooperation.

To shift from one cliche to another, Syria presents far

more problems than Humpty Dumpty. \\\`\\\`All the king's horses and

all the king's men'' couldn't put Syria back together by

negotiating a solution from the outside even if there was one

King instead of a divided mix of the United States, Russia,

Iran, Turkey, Iraq, the other states surrounding Syria, the

Arabian Gulf states, Egypt, and France and the other

interested European powers.

It shouldn't take a child's nursery rhyme to point out the

obvious--although it is one whose origins may date back to

England's civil wars and first appeared in print shortly

after it became fully clear that there was no way English

could ever bring the 13 colonies back under its control. To

begin with, there is no equivalent of Humpty.

Putting Four Humptys Together with No King and No Unity Among the

King's Men

The problem is not simply ISIS or Assad. ISIS is one of the

four \\\`\\\`Humptys'' in a shattered Syria, but ISIS controls only

a limited part of Syria's population even in the east. ISIS

occupies both parts of Syria and Iraq. It continues to

systematically purge any religious and ideological dissent

while neither government in Damascus or the government in

Baghdad have shown any clear ability to gain support from a

major portion of the Sunnis in the area that ISIS controls.

So far, neither the forces of the Syrian or Iraqi

government have had much military success against ISIS, and

U.S. claims that Iraq has regained some 35% of the territory

it lost to ISIS are little more than dishonest spin. They are

based on the maximum line of ISIS advance before any fighting

took place and before ISIS established any level of

governance or control. They include vast areas of unpopulated

desert: areas where no one controls anything because no one

is there.

The Kurds

The second Humpty consists of the Syrian Kurds--who have

gone from a partially disenfranchised minority to the

equivalent of a mini-state in the north and east of Syria,

and have been the only real U.S. military train and assist

success. They have no reason to support Assad or any of those

who support Assad. They too are divided, and some have ties

to Turkish Kurds, some to Iraqi Kurds, some to both, and some

are independent.

At the same time, they have no clear economic viability as

a state, face growing water problems, and would need to grab

a significant part of Syria's limited oil and gas resources

in the East to be viable unless they somehow united in a

broader Kurdish entity--one that included Turkish and/or

Iraqi Kurds and would be likely to create a new set of

regional conflicts.

Furthermore, these Administration claims and maps that talk

about liberating 35% of the area that ISIS occupied ignore

the fact that control of much of the disputed populated areas

in Anbar remains undecided, and that it was the Iraqi Kurds

which not only recovered much of the lost populated areas

that did matter, but grabbed a large additional part of

Iraq--including Kirkuk and its oil fields--and created a

whole new dimension of the Kurdish problem and its tensions

with Iraq's Arab and the Turks while the corrupt government

in the Kurdish zone of Iraq has divided and threated to

create a new round of internal power struggles.

The Other Sunni Fighters

The third Humpty consists of an uncertain coalition of

other Sunni fighters. They control--or are fighting for

control--in many of the most populated areas in Syria. There

are no reliable unclassified estimates of the number,

strength, and ideological character of these factions but

there are well over 20 groups--and some estimates go well

over 30.

Some, like the Al Nusra Front--one of the most successful

in military terms--are linked to Al Qaeda. Others are less

radical Islamist factions, but are scarcely secular or

moderate, also have no ties to the hollow outside efforts to

create moderate governments in exile, and are being backed by

Arab states like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The small

groups being given limited support with U.S. weapons and

Special Forces assistance are at best petty and uncertain

players.

This is also a group of fighters that is fighting the pro-

Assad forces in what is increasingly becoming a wasteland.

The fighting on the ground, Assad's barrel bombs and the

threat of poison gas, deliberate isolation and efforts to

starve out rebel held areas have created one of them most

serious humanitarian disasters in any one country in modern

history.

Many of the more than 4 million Syrian refugees that had

left Syria lived in the area where this fight takes place.

The same is true of the well over 7 million internally

displaced persons (IDPs) that no long have a real home, job,

business, or access to key services like health and

education.

Many of the more than 250,000 Syrian civilian dead, and at

least 500,000 seriously wounded are the product of this

fighting--although it is important to note that the UN ceased

to be able to make meaningful casualty estimates well over

half a year ago, and the estimates of refugees and IDPs have

ceased to increase because (a) there no longer is a basis for

guesstimating the increase, and (b) many of the remainder are

simply too poor to leave.

To go back to cliche number one, this is the area where the

forest has now been burning for some four years. This was one

of the

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most populated and developed parts of Syria. It is an area

where Syria's already poor economy probably now has a GDP

around 20% of what it was in 2011 and has no clear basis for

recovery. It is an area where no top down negotiation between

Assad or his backers and any outside faction can begin to put

even one Humpty back together again.

The Assad Faction(s)

The fourth version of Humpty is the group of factions and

fighters supporting Assad. It is important to note that this

is not a unified group. No one has given most of those in the

area Assad control a choice as to who controls them. The

majority of the population is Sunni and other non-Alawites.

The Alawites are not Shi'ite, and are a gnostic religious

group that may have political ties to Iran and the Hezbollah,

but Alawites are not Muslims in the normal sense of the term.

There are no reliable data on Syria's population. The CIA

estimates, however, that some 17-18 million people remain in

Syria, it estimates that 87% are Muslim (official; includes

74% Sunni 74% and 13% that are a mix of Alawi, Ismaili, and

Shia). Some 10% are Christian (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and

Nestorian), and the final 3% are Druze and some small number

of Jews who remain in Damascus and Aleppo).

If one looks at the maps of Syria's sectarian and ethnic

divisions before the fighting, they are also distributed into

a series of small enclaves, many near the coast. They have no

clear \\\`\\\`region,'' and it is far from clear how many of the

Sunnis in the regular Syrian forces, the real Shi'ites and

other minorities in Syria, or the more secular Sunni

businesspersons and civilians would support either Assad or

any mix of Assad supporters if they had a choice.

It is also important to note that the World Bank rated the

Assad regime as having some of the worst governance in the

world before the uprising began in 2011. It was also rated as

deeply corrupt. Transparency International rated it as the

159th most corrupt country in the world--out of 175--in 2014.

The Arab and UN development reports warned that the younger

Assad was no better in moving the country towards real

economic development than his father, and that the massive

population increase in Syria had created a \\\`\\\`youth bulge''

for which there were often no real jobs.

The Syrian GDP per capita was at best around $5,100 even in

Purchasing Power Parity P terms in 2011 before the upheavals

began--and ranked a dismal 165th in the world. It now may

average half that level. Some 33% of the population is 0-14

years of age; 14% is 15-24, and over 500,000 young Syrian men

and women now reach job age each year in a country where

direct (ignoring disguised) unemployment is estimated to be

33-35%, and the poverty level was well over 12% before the

fighting started.

A Time for Honesty, Transparency, and Realism

One cannot ignore trees, anymore than one can ignore the

forest. The failure of U.S. policy and military efforts,

Russian and Iranian support of Assad and major Russian

military intervention, and the conflicting ways in which

other states intervene will all make things worse. The impact

of religious warfare and extremism, and failed Syrian

secularism, are even more serious problems.

It is time, however, to stop focusing on either ISIS or

Assad, to pretend that Syrian \\\`\\\`moderates'' are strong enough

to either affect the security situation or negotiate for

Syria's real fighters, and act as if a shattered nation could

be united by some top down negotiation between groups that

hate each other and have no competence in dealing with the

economic, social, and governance challenges Syria now faces.

The first step in solving a problem is to honestly assess

it. No negotiation can work that does not deal with grim

realities and divisions created by years of fighting. No

amount of U.S. and Russian intervention and argument can

bring security or stability. No UN effort at conventional

negotiation can survive encounter with reality, and no effort

of any kind that does not address the sheer scale of Syrian

recovery and reconstruction.

Ms. KAPTUR. Anthony Cordesman, probably one of the most respected

thinkers on this subject, ends a very significant analysis of the

situation in Syria and greater Europe with this admonition. He tells

America: \\\`\\\`We face a moment of facing up to honesty, transparency, and

realism.''

And he tells us, \\\`\\\`One cannot ignore trees anymore than one can

ignore the forest,'' related to Syria. \\\`\\\`The failure of U.S. policy and

military efforts, Russian and Iranian support of Assad and major

Russian military intervention, and the conflicting ways in which other

states intervene will all make matters worse. The impact of religious

warfare and extremism, and failed Syrian secularism, are even more

serious problems.

\\\`\\\`It is time, however, to stop focusing on either ISIS or Assad, to

pretend that Syrian \\\`moderates' are strong enough to either affect the

security situation or negotiate for Syria's real fighters, and act as

if a shattered nation could be united by some top-down negotiation

between groups that hate each other and have no competence in dealing

with the economic, social, and governance challenges Syria now faces.

\\\`\\\`The first step in solving a problem is to honestly assess it. No

negotiation can work that does not deal with grim realities and

divisions created by years of fighting. No amount of U.S. and Russian

intervention and argument can bring security or stability. No U.N.

effort at conventional negotiation can survive encounter with reality,

and no effort of any kind that does not address the sheer scale of

Syrian recovery and reconstruction'' can work.

I commend his writings to my colleagues and the major studies that

have been done this year by the Center for Strategic and International

Studies as providing a glimmer of the road that we must walk toward.

I want to just thank my colleagues for the opportunity to place this

in the Record tonight.

I want to thank the Syrian Americans that live in northern Ohio for

their patriotic citizenship and their deep concern about what more the

United States of America could do to bring resolution to this deeply

troubling conflict in Syria that has precipitated such unrest, not just

through that region but, indeed, to all of greater Europe.

I yield back the remainder of my time.

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