SYRIA; Congressional Record Vol. 159, No. 122

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SYRIA

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I come to the floor this morning to discuss

another senseless act of violence and our Nation's response.

In the early morning hours of August 21, the Syrian military began

firing artillery rockets into the suburbs east of Damascus, hitting

neighborhoods held by opposition forces that had been fighting to end

the brutal dictatorship of Bashar al Assad.

We know from the accounts of independent observers such as Human

Rights Watch, the work of our intelligence services, and those of our

allies, that many of these rockets were armed with warheads carrying

sarin, a deadly nerve gas. We know these rockets were launched from

areas under the control of Assad's regime, using munitions known to be

part of Assad's arsenal, and into areas held by opposition forces. We

know from the report of the U.N. weapons inspectors released yesterday

that the weapons used, both the rockets and the chemicals themselves,

were of professional manufacture, including weapons known to be in the

Syrian Government's arsenal. There is no other source of this deadly

gas except the Syrian Government. Nothing else makes any sense

whatsoever.

President Obama declared that the United States would act in response

to this threat to global security. He determined it was necessary to

use American military force to degrade Assad's chemical capability and

deter future use of such weapons by Assad or others. He did so because

a failure to act would weaken the international prohibition on chemical

weapons use. He did so because the failure to act could lead to greater

proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction, including the

potential that they could fall into the hands of terrorists and used

against our people. He did so because if the use of chemical weapons

becomes routine, our troops could pay a huge price in future conflicts.

On September 4, a bipartisan majority of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee approved the President's request for an authorization of the

limited use of military force.

Faced with this credible threat of the use of force and in response

to a diplomatic probe by Secretary Kerry, Russia--which had for more

than 2 years blocked every diplomatic initiative to hold Assad

accountable for the violent repression of his people--announced that

Assad's chemical arsenal should be eliminated.

The agreement that followed requires Syria to give up its chemical

arsenal on a historically rapid timetable.

Within a week Syria must fully account for its chemical weapons

stockpiles and infrastructure. By the end of November, U.N. inspectors

must be allowed to complete their assessments and key equipment used to

produce chemical agents must be destroyed. All of Syria's chemical

stocks, materials and equipment must be destroyed by the end of next

year.

Any failure to abide by the terms of the agreement would lead to

consideration of penalties under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, under

which the U.N. Security Council may authorize among other steps

\\\`\\\`action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or

restore international peace and security.'' Regardless of U.N. action

or inaction, the President retains the option of using force if Assad

fails to fully comply.

This agreement is a significant step toward a goal we could not have

achieved with the use of force. The authorization approved by the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee had the stated purpose of degrading

Assad's chemical capability and deterring the use of chemical weapons

by Assad or by others. What can now be achieved is more than degrading

and deterring. We may be able to eliminate one of the world's largest

stockpiles of chemical weapons.

We should have no illusions that achieving this outcome will be easy.

First are the technical and logistical challenges. Many have expressed

concern about the likelihood that Assad's stockpiles can be secured and

disposed of as quickly as this agreement provides--by the end of 2014--

especially given the dangerous security environment in Syria. I share

these concerns. But accepting and addressing these challenges is a

better course than not acting against the certain danger of leaving

these weapons in the hands of a brutal dictator allied with Hezbollah,

a dictator who has demonstrated a willingness to use them against

civilians.

Some have expressed doubts that Assad and Russia will follow through

on the agreement which was reached in Geneva. To address these doubts,

we must inspect, verify, and continue to hold open the option of a

strike against Assad's chemical capability if he fails to fully abide

by the Geneva agreement.

What I do not understand is why some of the same voices who called

for the United States to get Russia to end its obstructionism now

criticize the President for getting the Russians involved. I was

disappointed to hear my Michigan colleague, Congressman Mike Rogers,

make the irresponsible claim that this agreement amounts to \\\`\\\`being led

by the nose'' by Russia. This contradicts his previous statements that

we need to put pressure on Russia to get involved in a solution to the

Syrian threat.

Chairman Rogers has also said: \\\`\\\`What keeps me up at night: We know

of at least a dozen or so sites that have serious chemical weapons

caches'' in Syria, and stressed the urgency that \\\`\\\`all the right steps

are taken so that we don't lose these weapons caches and something more

horrific happens.''

Thanks to U.S. pressure and a threat to take military action in

response to Assad's use of chemicals, the Russians are finally getting

involved in getting Syria to respond. We have taken a major step toward

securing these chemical weapons as Chairman Rogers himself so strongly

urged.

We need not rely on good intentions from those who have not shown

good intentions in the past. It was the credible threat of the use of

military force that brought Russia and Syria to the bargaining table.

It is a continued credible threat of military force that will keep them

on track to uphold the provisions of that agreement.

The President has made it clear, and rightfully so, that \\\`\\\`if

diplomacy fails, the United States remains prepared to act.''

Secretary Kerry, standing right beside his Russian counterpart in

Geneva, emphasized this agreement in no way limits President Obama's

option to use force if it becomes necessary.

Many of our colleagues have stressed repeatedly in recent weeks that

the credible force, the credible threat of military force, is essential

to reining in Assad. I strongly agree. For the life of me, I cannot

understand why those who have taken that position would now argue, as

some of those same colleagues are arguing, that the Geneva agreement is

somehow of little or no

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use because they say it somehow removes the option to use force. The

Geneva agreement says nothing of that sort.

Their argument isn't just inaccurate, it is damaging to our efforts.

Why would those who believe the threat of force is essential to keeping

pressure on Syria and Russia want to argue it is no longer available?

Why would those who have accurately said the United States does not

need international approval to use its military forces now argue the

Geneva agreement leaves us in the position of needing to get

international approval to use force in this case when the Geneva

agreement does nothing of the sort?

Some have criticized the Geneva agreement for not doing more to aid

the Syrian opposition. Russia and Syria tried to get an agreement from

us to not support the opposition, but they failed to get that agreement

from us in the Geneva agreement or anywhere else. Indeed, the

administration is seeking ways to facilitate the additional support for

the opposition that so many of us believe is essential.

I believe we should facilitate the provision of additional military

aid to the opposition, particularly the vetted elements of Syria's

opposition forces, including antitank weapons. Such aid will help the

Syrian people defend themselves from the brutal Assad regime,

furthering our goal of bringing a negotiated end to his rule.

I find it troubling that so much of the commentary on this topic has

not dealt with substance and policy. Washington has been and always

will be a political town, but we now reach the point where politics

seems to be the only lens through which so many people around here view

the most important and serious matters of the day, including national

security.

Speculation as to motives, or about potential winners or losers, or

who is up and who is down, misses the point. This is not an ice-skating

contest with points awarded for style. What is important is our

national security and whether this agreement advances it. Removing

weapons of mass destruction from the hands of a brutal dictator--a

preliminary outcome, yes, but real and tangible--is the direct result

of American leadership.

A month, a year, or 5 years ago, an agreement to eliminate Assad's

chemical weapons would have been seen as a significant gain for our

security and for the world's security, not just for the President who

achieved it but far more importantly, again, for the safety of our

people, of our troops, and the entire world.

I hope as we continue with the hard work of implementing this

agreement and as we seek an end to Bashar al Assad's rule, we can keep

our eyes on those goals and skip the superficial political scorekeeping

and inaccurate potshots that distract us from achieving those goals.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Schatz). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. THUNE. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call

be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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