الذاكرة السورية هي ملك لكل السوريين. يستند عملنا إلى المعايير العلمية، وينبغي أن تكون المعلومات دقيقة وموثوقة، وألّا تكتسي أيّ صبغة أيديولوجية. أرسلوا إلينا تعليقاتكم لإثراء المحتوى.أرسل ملاحظة

SYRIA; Congressional Record Vol. 159, No. 119

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SYRIA

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the decision on whether to authorize the

President of the United States to use the military might of our great

Nation against another country is the most significant vote a Senator

can cast. The Constitution vests this responsibility in Congress--a

duty that rests heavily on the shoulders of each and every Member.

We are now engaged in a serious debate about what the appropriate

response should be to the horrific use of

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chemical weapons by the regime of Syrian President Asad who killed his

own people using chemical weapons on August 21. This was not the first

use of chemical weapons by President Asad. He launched several smaller

scale attacks, murdering his citizens, and, notably, many, if not all,

of those attacks occurred after the President drew his redline a year

ago. But it was not until the large-scale August 21 attack of this

year, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,400 people, that

President Obama decided a military strike against Syria was warranted.

The fact is Asad violated the international convention prohibiting the

use of chemical weapons and crossed President Obama's redline many

times during the past year.

Deciding whether to grant the President this authority is a very

difficult decision. I have participated in numerous discussions with

the President, the Vice President, and experts in and out of

government. I have attended many classified briefings as a member of

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and I have carefully

weighed the assessments of the intelligence community and military and

State Department officials. My constituents have also provided me with

valuable insights that have helped to guide my decision. After much

deliberation and thought, I have decided I cannot support the

resolution that was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

last week.

One of the criteria for the use of military force is surely whether

the adversary poses an imminent threat to the American people. More

than once President Obama has stated Syria's chemical weapons and

delivery systems do not pose a direct imminent threat to the United

States. Neither the United States nor any of our allies have been

attacked with chemical weapons. Instead, President Obama justifies the

attack he is proposing as a response to the violation of international

norms, despite the fact that we currently lack international partners

to enforce the Convention on Chemical Weapons through military means.

Although the term \\\`\\\`limited air strikes'' sounds less threatening,

the fact is even limited air strikes constitute an act of war. If bombs

were dropped from the air or cruise missiles were launched into an

American city, we would certainly consider that to be an act of war,

and that is why this decision is fraught with consequences.

American military strikes against the Asad regime, in my judgment,

risk entangling the United States in the middle of a protracted,

dangerous, and ugly civil war. GEN Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, has warned us that the use of U.S. military

force \\\`\\\`cannot resolve the underlying and historic ethnic, religious,

and tribal issues that are fueling this conflict.''

The introduction of American Armed Forces into this violent conflict

could escalate to the point where we are perceived to be, or actually

are, involved in a Syrian civil war or a proxy war with Hezbollah or

Iran.

In this complex conflict, it is also becoming increasingly difficult

to sort out the good guys from the bad. There is no doubt that Asad is

a brutal, ruthless dictator who murders his own citizens and who is

supported by thousands of Hezbollah terrorist fighters. The opposition,

however, is not pure. It has now been infiltrated by not one but two

affiliates of Al Qaeda as well as by criminal gangs. Caught in the

middle are millions of Syrians who simply want to lead peaceful lives.

The tragic result has been more than 100,000 people killed, 4 million

displaced internally, and 2 million refugees.

We do not know how Asad or his allies would respond to a U.S.

military attack, but an asymmetric attack by Hezbollah aimed at one of

our bases or at other American interests abroad certainly is one

potential response. My concern is that reprisals, followed by

subsequent retaliations, followed by still more reprisals could lead to

an escalation of violence which never was intended by the President but

which may well be the result of the first strike.

I have raised this issue directly with administration officials since

the \\\`\\\`one and done'' strike, as retired GEN Michael Hayden puts it, may

well not work. I have asked the administration what they would do if

Asad waits until the 91st day, when the authorization for the use of

military force expires, and then conducts an attack using chemical

weapons that kills a much smaller number of people. What will we do

then? In each case where I have raised this question, I have been told

that we would likely launch another military strike.

In addition to my concern about being dragged into the Syrian civil

war, I question whether the proposed military response would be more

effective in achieving the goal of eliminating Asad's stockpile of

chemical weapons than a diplomatic approach would be.

Let's be clear. The strikes proposed by the President would not

eliminate Asad's chemical weapons, nor his means of delivering them. In

the President's own words, the purpose of these strikes is \\\`\\\`to degrade

Asad's capabilities to deliver chemical weapons.'' Indeed, you will not

find any military or intelligence official who believes that the strike

contemplated by the administration would eliminate Syria's chemical

weapons stockpile or all of the delivery systems. General Dempsey wrote

to Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin that even if an

explicit military mission to secure Syria's chemical weapons were

undertaken, it would result in the control of \\\`\\\`some, but not all''

chemical weapons in Syria, and that is not what is being discussed

because that would undoubtedly involve boots on the ground.

According to the President, the purpose of his more narrow objective

is to deliver a calculated message to convince Asad not to use his

remaining chemical weapons and delivery systems ever again. But would

such a strike be effective in preventing Asad from using these weapons

again on a small scale after he has absorbed the strike just to deliver

his own message that he retains the capability to do so? Asad would

retain a sufficient quantity of chemical weapons, and he knows that we

did not respond to smaller chemical weapons attacks that he undertook

before the August 21, 2013, event.

So on the one hand, the President is seeking to conduct a precision

military strike that is sufficient to deter Asad from using any

chemical weapons again. On the other hand, he wants to narrow the scope

of a military strike so that Asad does not perceive this act of war as

a threat to his regime. Yet the President has previously stated that

U.S. policy is the removal of Asad.

While administration officials have gone out of their way to state

that the military strikes are only to deter and degrade Asad's chemical

weapons use and are not intended to pick sides in the civil war, the

text of the resolution before us is at odds with the administration's

representations. The text states that it is the policy of the United

States to \\\`\\\`change the momentum on the battlefield in Syria so as to

create favorable conditions for a negotiated settlement that ends the

conflict and leads to a democratic government in Syria.'' Well, no one

could ever consider the Asad dictatorship to be a democratic government

in Syria.

Furthermore, on September 3 Secretary of State John Kerry testified

that \\\`\\\`it is not insignificant that to deprive \\\[Asad\\\] of the capacity

to use chemical weapons or to degrade the capacity to use those

chemical weapons actually deprives him of a lethal weapon in this

ongoing civil war, and that has an impact.''

That is a very mixed message from this administration about the

purpose of these strikes.

All of us want to see a peaceful Syria, no longer led by Asad, nor

controlled by the radical Islamic extremists who are part of his

opposition. But is military action that could well get us involved in

Syria's civil war the right answer?

When I think about the proper response to Asad's abhorrent use of

chemical weapons, I am mindful of the suffering and death that has

occurred as well as the international conventions banning chemical

weapons. Since this is an international norm, however, where are our

international partners--the United Nations, NATO, the Arab League?

I have grave reservations about undertaking an act of war to enforce

an international convention without the international support we have

previously had when undertaking similar action in the past, such as in

Kosovo,

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Afghanistan, and even Iraq. While NATO's Secretary General has

expressed support for consequences, NATO's North Atlantic Council,

which is the body that approves military action for NATO, has not

approved this military action. The Arab League has condemned with words

the use of chemical weapons, but there is yet to be any Arab League

statement that explicitly endorses military action or promises to be

engaged in that action. Even our ally who has been most supportive,

France, has asked for a delay to allow the U.N. inspectors to deliver

their report next week.

Let me add that I believe that report early next week will verify

that it was the Asad regime that used sarin gas. That is my

expectation.

A military strike may well enforce the international norm with

respect to chemical weapons, but at the same time it would weaken the

international norm of limiting military action to instances of self-

defense or those cases where we have the support of the international

community or at least our allies in NATO or the Arab League.

In addressing this difficult and tragic crisis in Syria, the

administration initially presented us with only two choices: Take

military action or make no response at all. I reject and have rejected

from the start the notion that the United States has only two choices--

undertaking an act of war or doing nothing in response to President

Asad's attack on his citizens. There are a variety of nonmilitary

responses to consider that may well be more effective. The most

promising of these options, proposed by the Russians--one of Asad's

strongest allies--would place Syria's chemical weapons stockpile in the

custody of the international community before they would ultimately be

destroyed.

I am not naive about \\\`\\\`trusting'' the Russians. My point is that this

option may well be in Russia's own interests, would be more effective

in securing the stockpile of chemical weapons in Syria, and would

involve the international community. This diplomatic alternative would

put Syria's chemical weapons under verified international control and

would once and for all prevent Asad or anyone else in Syria from using

those weapons. A risk of attacking Asad's facilities is that the

chemical weapons could fall into the hands of terrorist elements in the

country. That risk would be eliminated if the weapons were removed

completely from Syria.

One of the arguments advanced by proponents of the authorization for

the use of military force resolution is that America's credibility is

on the line. This is a legitimate concern. To be sure, it was

unfortunate that the President drew a line in the sand without first

having a well-vetted plan, consulting with Congress, and obtaining the

necessary support for doing so. I would maintain, however, that the

credibility of our great Nation is beyond that of just one statement by

the President, even in his important capacity as Commander in Chief.

The credibility of the United States is backed by a military that is

the most advanced and capable in the world. The strength of our

military sends the clear, unmistakable message that the United States

is capable of exerting overwhelming force whenever we decide it is the

right thing to do and it is necessary to do so. It would be a mistake

for our adversaries to interpret a single vote regarding a military

response to Syria's chemical weapons program as having ramifications

for our willingness to use force when our country or our allies face

direct imminent threats, especially with regard to the proliferation of

nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.

At the very least we have an obligation to pursue all nonmilitary

options that may well be more effective in preventing the future use of

Asad's chemical weapons than the military option the President has

proposed to undertake.

For these reasons, should the authorization for the use of military

force approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee come to the

Senate floor, I shall cast my vote in opposition.

My hope, however, is that the negotiations underway with the Russians

will pave the way for the removal of chemical stockpiles from Syria and

for their verified ultimate destruction. That is the best outcome for

this crisis. That would lead to a safer world.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.

Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, I understand that Members can speak for

up to 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

&nbsp;

المعلومات الأساسية

تاريخ الصدور

2013/09/11

iranDocument

لا

نوع الوثيقة

كلمة / إحاطة

اللغة

الإنجليزية

كود الذاكرة السورية

SMI/A200/571170

وثائق أخرى للجهة المصدرة

UKRAINE; Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 43

نوع الوثيقة:

كلمة / إحاطة

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/03/10

Syria (Executive Session); Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 22

نوع الوثيقة:

كلمة / إحاطة

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/02/03

Foreign Policy (Executive Calendar); Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 55

نوع الوثيقة:

كلمة / إحاطة

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/03/29

Expressing the sense of the Senate condemning the Russian Federation

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/03/15

COMMEMORATING THE 11-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA; Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 54

نوع الوثيقة:

كلمة / إحاطة

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/03/28

H.R.7276 — 117th Congress (2021-2022)

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/04/07

H.Res.1038 — 117th Congress (2021-2022)

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/04/06

شهادة أندرو إكسوم (Andrew Exum) نائب مساعد وزير الدفاع لسياسات الشرق الأوسط أمام الكونغرس حول الاتفاق مع روسيا لمنع سقوط نظام الأسد 

نوع الوثيقة:

شهادة

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2019/05/09

UKRAINE INVASION WAR CRIMES DETERRENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT; Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 61

نوع الوثيقة:

كلمة / إحاطة

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/04/06

Recognizing the 11th anniversary of the Syrian revolution against Bashar al-Assad.

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/03/15

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