AUTHORIZING THE LIMITED AND SPECIFIED USE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES AGAINST SYRIA--MOTION TO PROCEED; Congressional Record Vol. 159, No. 118

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AUTHORIZING THE LIMITED AND SPECIFIED USE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED

FORCES AGAINST SYRIA\\--MOTION TO PROCEED

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I move to proceed to Calendar No. 166, \[S.J.

Res. 21\](https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/21).

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Motion to proceed to \[S.J. Res. 21\](https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/21) to authorize the limited

and specified use of the United States Armed Forces against

Syria.

Schedule

Mr. REID. Mr. President, following my and Senator McConnell's

remarks, there will be a period of morning business until 11 a.m. this

morning. At 11 a.m. we will resume consideration of the motion to

proceed to the Syria resolution. The time until noon will be divided

and controlled between the two leaders or their designees. The Senate

will recess from noon until 2:15 p.m. to allow for our caucus meetings.

The leader and I have talked this morning--and prior to this

morning--with regard to the energy efficiency bill. We automatically go

to that bill at 11 a.m. We are trying to work out a way we can go to

that bill. Senators Shaheen and Portman have worked for more than a

year to come up with a bill. We have not done an energy bill in a long

time, so there is a desire on both sides to move forward on this.

Senator Shaheen and Senator Portman have bipartisan amendments they

want to offer to their bill, and I have expressed to the Republican

leader that we need to move to that when we finish the Syria issue. I

would like permission to move to that bill at the appropriate time.

Once we get on the bill and we get the CR from the House, for example,

I told the Republican leader--and everyone who wants to hear--that we

don't have to finish the energy efficiency bill all at one time. We

want to have an amendment process, and we will do that. I don't want to

file cloture on the motion to proceed again, so we have instructed our

staffs to try to come up with something before 11 a.m. that we can

agree on.

I repeat. There will be amendments offered, and we will have adequate

time to work on this. We may not be able to do it all at one time, but

we will do it and finish this legislation.

Syria

Mr. President, we are engaged in a very important debate. The Syria

debate is one that cannot be taken lightly, and I don't believe anyone

has taken it lightly. The discussion and bipartisan resolution under

consideration is simply too important to be rushed through the Senate

or given short shrift. So it is right and proper that the President be

given an opportunity to meet with Senators from both parties, as he

will today. He will meet with us at 12:30 p.m. When he finishes with

us, it is my understanding he will report to Senator McConnell's

conference.

In addition to that, he is going to address the Nation tonight. He is

going to speak directly to the American people about the potential for

limited military action to Syria. He will do that at 9 p.m. tonight.

As I said last night, it is appropriate to allow other conversations

to go on. We now have--as a result of some work done by other

countries--France, Russia, and we understand Syria is involved in this

as well. This is aimed at avoiding military action. We will have to see

if this works out.

It is very important to understand that the only reason Russia is

seeking an alternative to military action is that President Obama has

made it plain and clear that the United States will act, if we must.

Our credible threat of force has made these diplomatic discussions with

Syria possible, and the United States should not withdraw from the

direction we are taking as a country.

If there is a realistic chance--and I certainly hope there is--to

secure Syria's chemical weapons without further atrocities of the Asad

regime, we should not turn our backs on that chance. But for such a

solution to be plausible, the Asad regime must act quickly and prove

that their offer is real and not merely a ploy to delay military action

or action by the body of the Senate.

Any agreement must also assure that chemical weapons in the hands of

Syria can be secured and done in an open process, even in the midst of

this ongoing war we have in Syria. Any agreement must ensure that Syria

is unable to transfer its dangerous chemical

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weapons to the hands of terrorists in that area. Such an attempt would

be met with a rapid and robust response from the United States.

I am pleased the administration is considering this offer. I am

pleased other countries are involved in addition to Russia. It is my

understanding that France is heavily involved, as of a few hours ago,

and I think that is the right direction at this time. We will move

forward but under the general criteria I have suggested and outlined.

The Senate should give these international discussions time to play

out but not unlimited time. That is why, although there is support to

move forward and debate this bipartisan resolution reported by Senators

Menendez and Corker--they did a terrific job for the committee last

week--I didn't rush to file cloture, as I indicated last night, on the

motion to proceed. We don't need to prove how quickly we can do this

but how well we can do this.

The Syrian regime should fully understand that the United States is

watching very closely. The Asad regime should be warned our country

will not tolerate this breach of human decency and long-held

international consensus against the use of chemical weapons.

Unanimous Consent Agreement--S. 1392

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order with

respect to \[S. 1392\](https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1392), which is the energy efficiency legislation, be

modified so that the motion to proceed be agreed to at a time to be

determined by me with the concurrence of the Republican leader--not

consultation with him but concurrence with him.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Markey). Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Recognition of the Minority Leader

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader is recognized.

Syria

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, first, I would like to welcome the

President to the Capitol today. Members on both sides of the aisle are

eager to hear from him and to share their own thoughts. We look forward

to a spirited and constructive exchange.

It is often said that of all the questions we face as lawmakers, none

is more serious or indeed more difficult than the question of whether

to commit ourselves to military action. That is why it is so important

for us to have this debate, to lay out the arguments for and against

military action in Syria, to let the public know where we stand on this

issue and why.

If debates such as this are always challenging, in some ways this one

has been even more difficult, not because of some political calculus--

though cynics will always suspect that--no, this debate has been made

more difficult because even those of us who truly want to support the

Commander in Chief have struggled to understand the purpose of the

mission.

Over the past several days I have spoken with a lot of people--a lot

of Kentuckians--and most of them are not exactly clear about the

mission or shy about saying so. What I have told them is that I

understand their concerns, and I share them. I also appreciate the war

weariness out there, but then I tell them there are other potential

concerns we cannot ignore either. Chief among them is the fact that the

credibility of the Commander in Chief matters, and related to that is

the fact that we cannot afford, as a country, to withdraw from the

world stage. So no one should be faulted for being skeptical about this

proposal, regardless of what party they are in, or for being

dumbfounded--literally dumbfounded--at the ham-handed manner in which

the White House announced it.

There is absolutely no reason to signal to the enemy when, how, and

for how long we plan to strike them--none. As I have said before, we

don't send out a save-the-date card to the enemy. Yet there are other

important considerations to keep in mind as well that go beyond the

wisdom or the marketing of the proposal.

I have spent a lot of time weighing all of these things. I thought a

lot about America's obligations and the irreplaceable role I have

always believed, and still believe, America plays in the world. I have

also thought a lot about the context, about this President's vision and

his record and what it says about whether we should be confident in his

ability to bring about a favorable outcome in Syria because how we got

to this point says a lot about where we may be headed. That is why,

before announcing my vote, I think it is important to look back at some

of the President's other decisions on matters of foreign policy and

national security and then turn back to what he is proposing now in

Syria because, in the end, these things simply cannot be separated.

It is not exactly a State secret that I am no fan of this President's

foreign policy. On the deepest level I think it comes down to a

fundamentally different view of America's role in the world. Unlike the

President, I have always been a firm and unapologetic believer in the

idea that America isn't just another Nation among many; that we are,

indeed, exceptional. As I have said, I believe we have a duty as a

superpower, without imperialistic aims, to help maintain an

international order and balance of power that we and other allies have

worked very hard to achieve over the years.

The President, on the other hand, has always been a very reluctant

Commander in Chief. We saw that in the rhetoric of his famous Cairo

speech and in speeches he gave in other foreign capitals in the early

days of his administration. The tone, and the policies that followed,

were meant to project a humbler, more withdrawn America. Frankly, I am

hard pressed to see any good that came from any of that.

Any list would have to start with the arbitrary deadlines for

military withdrawal and the triumphant declaration that Guantanamo

would be closed within a year, without any plan of what to do with its

detainees. There were the executive orders that ended the CIA's

detention and interrogation programs.

We all saw the so-called \\\`\\\`reset'' with Russia and how the

President's stated commitment to a world without nuclear weapons led

him to hastily sign an arms treaty with Russia that did nothing to

substantially reduce its nuclear stockpile or its tactical nuclear

weapons. We saw the President announce a strategic pivot to the Asia-

Pacific region, without any real plan to fund it, and an effort to end

the capture, interrogation, and detention of terrorists, as well as the

return of the old idea that terrorism should be treated as a law

enforcement matter. After a decade-long counterinsurgency in

Afghanistan, we have seen the President's failure to invest in the kind

of strategic modernization that is needed to make this pivot to Asia

meaningful. Specifically, his failure to make the kind of investments

that are needed to maintain our dominance in the Asia-Pacific theater

in the kind of naval, air, and Marine Corps forces that we will need in

the years ahead could have tragic consequences down the road.

His domestic agenda has also obviously had serious implications for

our global standing. While borrowing trillions and wasting taxpayer

dollars here at home, the President has imposed a policy of austerity

at the Pentagon that threatens to undermine our stabilizing presence

around the globe. Of course, we have seen how eager the President is to

declare an end to the war on terror. Unfortunately, the world hasn't

cooperated. It hasn't cooperated with the President's vision or his

hopes. Far from responding favorably to this gentler approach, it has

become arguably more dangerous. We have learned the hard way that being

nice to our enemies doesn't make them like us or clear a path to peace.

I understand the President ran for office on an antiwar platform,

that his rise to political power was marked by his determination to get

us out of Afghanistan and Iraq, and to declare an end to the war on

terror. I know he would rather focus on his domestic agenda. But the

ongoing threat from Al Qaeda and its affiliates and the turmoil

unleashed by uprisings in north Africa and the broader Middle East, not

to mention the rise of Chinese military power, make it clear to me, at

least, that this is not the time for America to shrink from the world

stage.

The world is a dangerous place. In the wake of the Arab spring, large

parts of the Sinai, of Libya, of Syria, are now basically ungoverned.

We have seen prison breaks in Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, and the release of

hundreds of prisoners in Egypt. Terrorists have also escaped from

prisons in Yemen, a

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country that is no more ready to detain the terrorists at Guantanamo

now than they were back in 2009. And the flow of foreign fighters into

Syria suggests that the civil war there will last for years, regardless

of whether Asad is still in power.

Yes, the President deserves praise for weakening Al Qaeda's senior

leadership. But the threat we face from Al Qaeda affiliates is very

real. These terrorists are adaptable. They are versatile, lethal,

resilient, and they aren't going away. Pockets of these terrorists

extend from north Africa to the Persian Gulf and it is time he faced up

to it.

It is time to face up to something else as well: International order

is not maintained by some global police force which only exists in a

liberal fantasy. International order is maintained--its backbone is

American military might, which brings me back to Syria.

For 2 years now Syria has been mired in a ferocious civil war with

more than 100,000 killed with conventional arms. That is according to

U.N. estimates. This tragic situation has prompted many to look to the

United States for help. So 1 year ago President Obama made a

declaration: If Asad used or started moving chemical weapons, he would

do something about it.

Well, as we all know, on August 21 of this year, that redline was

crossed. The President's delayed response was to call for a show of

force for targeted, limited strikes against the regime. We have been

told the purpose of these strikes is to deter and degrade Asad's

regime's ability to use chemical weapons. So let's take a closer look

at these aims.

First, no one disputes that the atrocities committed in Syria in

recent weeks are unspeakable. No one disputes that those responsible

for these crimes against the innocent should be held to account. We

were absolutely right, of course, to condemn these crimes. But let's be

very clear about something: These attacks, monstrous as they are, were

not a direct attack against the United States or one of its treaty

allies. And just so there is no confusion, let me assure everyone that

if a weapon of mass destruction were used against the United States or

one of our allies, Congress would react immediately with an

authorization for the use of force in support of an overwhelming

response. I would introduce the resolution myself. So no leader in

North Korea or Iran or any other enemy of the United States should take

any solace if the United States were not to respond to these attacks

with an action against Syria. We will never--never--tolerate the use of

chemical weapons against the United States or any of its treaty allies.

Second, in the course of administration hearings and briefings over

the past several days, Secretary of State Kerry has revealed that Asad

has used chemical weapons repeatedly--repeatedly--over the last year.

So there is a further question here about why the administration didn't

respond on those occasions.

Third, Asad, as I have indicated, has killed tens of thousands of

people with conventional weapons. Is there any reason to believe he

won't continue if the President's strikes are as limited as we are told

they would be?

Fourth, what if, in degrading Asad's control of those weapons, we

make it easier for other extremist elements such as those associated

with the al-Nusra Front and Al Qaeda to actually get hold of

them themselves or what if, by weakening the Syrian military, we end up

tilting the military balance toward a fractured opposition that is in

no position to govern or control anything right now?

I think the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey,

put this particular best when he recently suggested in a letter to

Congress that the issue here isn't about choosing between two sides in

Syria, it is about choosing one among many sides; and that, in his

estimation, even if we were to choose sides, the side we chose wouldn't

be in a position to promote their own interests or ours. That is the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Then there is the question of how Asad himself will react to U.S.

action in Syria. If Asad views an air campaign as preparation for

regime change, then he may lose all constraint in the use of his

arsenal, chemical or otherwise, and lose any incentive whatsoever to

move to the negotiating table. It is very clear that the unintended

consequences of this strike could very well be a new cycle of

escalation, which then drags us into a larger war that we are all

seeking to avoid. Some have even suggested that the humanitarian crisis

surrounding the Syrian civil war could actually be made worse as a

result of even targeted U.S. strikes.

In the end, then, the President's proposal seems fundamentally flawed

since, if it is too narrow, it may not deter Asad's further use of

chemical weapons. But if it is too broad, it risks jeopardizing the

security of these same stockpiles, potentially putting them into the

hands of extremists.

That is why I think we are compelled in this case to apply a more

traditional standard on whether to proceed with a use of force, one

that asks a simple question: Does Asad's use of chemical weapons pose a

threat to the vital national security interests of the United States?

And the answer to that question is fairly obvious; even the President

himself says it doesn't.

One could argue, as I have suggested, that there is an important

national security concern at play, that we have a very strong interest

in preserving the credibility of our Commander in Chief, regardless of

the party in power, and in giving him the political support that

reinforces that credibility. This is an issue I take very seriously. It

is the main reason I have wanted to take my time in making a final

decision. But, ultimately, I have concluded that being credible on

Syria requires presenting a credible response and having a credible

strategy. For all of the reasons I have indicated, this proposal

doesn't pass muster.

Indeed, if, through this limited strike, the President's credibility

is not restored because Asad uses chemical weapons again, what then?

And new targets aimed at toppling the regime which end up jeopardizing

control of these same chemical weapons stashes--allowing them to fall

into the hands of Al Qaeda and others intent on using them against the

United States or our allies. Where would the cycle of escalation end?

Last night we learned about a Russian diplomatic gambit to forestall

U.S. military action through a proposal to secure and eventually

destroy the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile. This morning there are

initial reports that suggest Syria is supportive of them. Let me remind

everyone that even if this is agreed to, it is a still a long way off

to reaching an agreement at the United Nations, to Syria gaining entry

to the chemical weapons convention, and to eventually securing and

destroying the stockpile. As we have seen in my own State of Kentucky

where we have been working for 30 years to finally destroy a stockpile

of chemical weapons, destroying chemical weapons is extremely

challenging and requires a great deal of attention to detail and

safety. Nonetheless, this proposal is obviously worth exploring.

But, more broadly--and this is my larger point--this one punitive

strike we are debating could not make up for the President's

performance over the last 5 years. The only way--the only way--for him

to achieve the credibility he seeks is by embracing the kind of

serious, integrated, national security plan that matches strategy to

resources, capabilities to commitments, and which shows our allies

around the world that the United States is fully engaged and ready to

act at a moment's notice in all the major areas of concern around the

globe, whether it is the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, or in the

South China Sea, and, just as importantly, that he is willing to invest

in that strategy for the long term.

In Syria, a limited strike would not resolve the civil war there, nor

will it remove Asad from power. There appears to be no broader strategy

to train, advise, and assist a vetted opposition group on a meaningful

scale, as we did during the Cold War. What is needed in Syria is what

is needed almost everywhere else in the world from America right now: a

clear strategy and a President determined to carry it out.

When it comes to Syria, our partners in the Middle East--countries

such as Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel--all of them face real

consequences from instability, refugee

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flows, and the growth of terrorist networks. Responding to this crisis

requires a regional strategy and leadership. What we have gotten

instead is an administration that seems more interested in telling us

what the mission is not--more interested in telling us what the mission

is not--rather than what it is. We have gotten the same timid,

reluctant leadership that I have seen from the President for nearly 5

years.

As I have said, this decision was not easy. When the President of the

United States asks you to take a question like this seriously, you do

so. Because just as our credibility in Syria is tied up with our

credibility in places such as Iran and North Korea, so too is the

credibility of the Commander in Chief tied up, to a large extent, with

America's credibility in general. There is no doubt about that. So let

me repeat: I will stand shoulder to shoulder with this President or any

other in any case where our vital national security interests are

threatened, our treaty allies are attacked, or we face an imminent

threat.

As for Israel, very few people, if anyone, expect that Syria would

test its readiness to respond on its own, which just goes to show you

the importance of credibility on the world stage. As Prime Minister

Netanyahu put it last week, the enemies of Israel have very good reason

not to test its might. But the Prime Minister should know nonetheless

that America stands with him.

I have never been an isolationist, and a vote against this resolution

should not be confused by anyone as a turn in that direction. But just

as the most committed isolationist could be convinced of the need for

intervention under the right circumstances when confronted with a

threat, so too do the internationalists among us believe that all

interventions are not created equal. And this proposal just does not

stand up.

So I will be voting against this resolution. A vital national

security risk is clearly not at play, there are too many unanswered

questions about our long-term strategy in Syria, including the fact

that this proposal is utterly detached from a wider strategy to end the

civil war there, and on the specific question of deterring the use of

chemical weapons, the President's proposal appears to be based actually

on a contradiction: either we will strike targets that threaten the

stability of the regime--something the President says he does not

intend to do--or we will execute a strike so narrow as to be a mere

demonstration.

It is not enough, as General Dempsey has noted, to simply alter the

balance of military power without carefully considering what is needed

to preserve a functioning state after the fact. We cannot ignore the

unintended consequences of our actions.

But we also cannot ignore our broader obligations in the world. I

firmly believe the international system that was constructed on the

ashes of World War II rests upon the stability provided by the American

military, and by our commitments to our allies. It is a necessary role

that only we can continue to fulfill in the decades to come. And

especially in times like this, the United States cannot afford to

withdraw from the world stage. My record reflects that belief and that

commitment regardless of which party has controlled the White House. We

either choose to be dominant in the world or we resign ourselves and

our allies to the mercy of our enemies. We either defend our freedoms

and our civilization or it crumbles.

So as we shift our military focus to the Asia Pacific, we cannot

ignore our commitments to the Middle East, to stability in the Persian

Gulf, to an enduring presence in Afghanistan, to hunting down the

terrorists who would threaten the United States and its people. And

when the Commander in Chief sets his mind to action, the world should

think he believes in it. When the Commander in Chief sets his mind to

an action, the world should think he believes in it. Frankly, the

President did not exactly inspire confidence when he distanced himself

from his own redlines in Stockholm last week.

It is long past time the President drops the pose of the reluctant

warrior and lead. You cannot build an effective foreign policy on the

vilification of your predecessor alone. At some point, you have to take

responsibility for your own actions and see the world the way it is,

not the way you would like it to be.

If you wish to engage countries that have been hostile, so be it. But

be a realist, know the limits of rhetoric, and prepare for the worst.

For too long this President has put his faith in the power of his own

rhetoric to change the minds of America's enemies. For too long he has

been more interested in showing the world that America is somehow

different now than it has been in the past; it is humbler; it is not

interested in meddling in the affairs of others or in shaping events.

But in his eagerness to turn the page, he has blinded himself to

worrisome trends and developments from Tunisia to Damascus to Tehran

and in countless places in between.

A year ago this month four Americans were senselessly murdered on

sovereign U.S. territory in Benghazi. Last month the President ordered

the closing of more than two dozen diplomatic posts stretching from

west Africa to the Bay of Bengal. As I have indicated, and as the

decision to close these embassies clearly shows, the terrorist threat

continues to be real. Expressions of anti-Americanism are rampant

throughout Africa and the Middle East, even more so perhaps than when

the President first took office.

So the President's new approach has clearly come with a cost. And for

the sake of our own security and that of our allies, it is time he

recognized it. Because if America does not meet its international

commitments, who will? That is one question that those on the left who

are comfortable with a weakened America cannot answer, because the

answer is too frightening. No one will. That is the answer.

If this episode has shown us anything, it is that the time has come

for the President to finally acknowledge that there is no substitute

for American might. It is time for America to lead again, this time

from the front. But we need strategic vision, in the Middle East and in

many other places around the world, to do it.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Reservation Of Leader Time

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the leadership time

is reserved.

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