الذاكرة السورية هي ملك لكل السوريين. يستند عملنا إلى المعايير العلمية، وينبغي أن تكون المعلومات دقيقة وموثوقة، وألّا تكتسي أيّ صبغة أيديولوجية. أرسلوا إلينا تعليقاتكم لإثراء المحتوى.أرسل ملاحظة

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN SYRIA: CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE; Congressional Record Vol. 159, No. 93

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RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN SYRIA: CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE

\\\_\\\_\\\_\\\_\\\_\\\_

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

of new jersey

in the house of representatives

Wednesday, June 26, 2013

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, I chaired a joint

hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human

Rights, and International Organizations and the Subcommittee on the

Middle East and North Africa. We turned our attention to an overlooked

aspect of the crisis in Syria\\--the religious minorities caught in the

middle of the conflict and apparently targeted by government forces as

well as rebel groups.

More than 93,000 Syrians have been killed in this horrendous and

seemingly endless civil war. More than 4.25 million people are

displaced within Syria, with millions more fleeing to safety in the

surrounding countries of Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq. It is

disturbing to note that one in five of the refugees is Christian

although Christians in Syria make-up one in ten of the pre-war

population of 22 million people. This would seem to indicate that

Christians are even more fearful for their lives and safety than other

segments of the Syrian population.

Before the war, Syria was a fairly pluralistic society, with

Alawites, Shias, Ismailis, Yezidis, Druze, Christians, Jews, and Sunnis

living in relative peace, side by side. The situation was far from

perfect, as President Bashar al Assad's regime had a vast security

apparatus in place with members inside each of the religious

communities to monitor their activities.

The Assad government was guilty of serious human rights violations,

including the summary imprisonment and execution of political

opponents. But relations between the various religious groups were

generally not violent.

That civil co-existence has ended with the war. In February of this

year, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the

Syrian Arab Republic reported that, \\\`\\\`The conflict has become

increasingly sectarian, with the conduct of the parties becoming

significantly more radicalized and militarized.''

This followed on an earlier Commission report stating that, \\\`\\\`Entire

communities are at risk of being forced out of the country or of being

killed inside the country. With communities believing--not without

cause--that they face an existential threat. . . .''

We know that early in the civil war, Assad came to view the

Christian minority with suspicion, accusing churches of laundering

money and goods for opposition forces and forbidding banks from

transactions for certain churches.

There is also evidence that the Assad regime encouraged sectarian

tensions in order to maintain power--perhaps believing that if the

people were afraid of Islamists commandeering a nominally secular

state, the people would be more likely to support Assad over the

opposition.

In December 2012, Time Magazine reported allegations that the Assad

regime was paying individuals to pose as opposition supporters and

chant slogans at protests including \\\`\\\`The Christians to Beirut, the

Alawites to the grave.''

Our own government has voiced concern about the particular threat

posed to Christians

\\\[\\\[\[Page\](https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-159/extensions-of-remarks-section/page/E979) \[E979\](https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-159/extensions-of-remarks-section/page/E979)\\\]\\\]

in Syria. According to the State Department's International Religious

Freedom Report for 2012, \\\`\\\`The regime continued to frame opposition

actions as targeting the Christian population. At the same time, it

increased its own targeting of Christian and Alawi anti-regime

activists in order to eliminate minority-voices that might counter its

narrative of 'Sunni-Sponsored violence'.''

Religious minorities seem to fear the opposition forces. Some

prominent opposition groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) have a

religious basis which has been seen as threatening to Syria's Alawite

and Christian minorities.

Smaller opposition factions, such as the al-Qaeda-affiliated

jihadist al-Nusra Front, take explicitly sectarian positions. There are

reports of incidents in which rebel forces engaged in sectarian

violence, such as burning Shi'ite mosques.

Christians are perceived by many in the opposition to be Assad

loyalists, possibly due to Assad's aggressive recruitment of Christians

into the regime militias at the start of the civil war. Other reports

indicate that the Christians attempted to remain neutral either out of

pacifism or concern about their rights under opposition forces.

Christian neutrality was perceived by some opposition groups as

loyalty to the regime. In December 2012, a rebel force believed to be

associated with the Muslim Brotherhood released a Youtube video

entitled, \\\`\\\`Warning mainly Christian cities in the province of Hama'',

and promising attacks if they continue to support and house the pro-

Assad forces.

Christian leaders have been targeted, such as the April 2013

kidnapping of Mor Gregiorius Yohanna Ibrahim of the Syriac Orthodox

Church and Bishop Boulos Yazigi of the Greek Orthodox Church-both men

still have not been returned.

The Druze community reports being targeted as well. In March 2013, a

Druze leader reported to Christian Solidarity International, \\\`\\\`Our

people get stopped at checkpoints and are asked which sect they belong

to. Once the militias hear that they are from Swaida \\\[a province where

90% of the population is Druze\\\], our men disappear.''

The al-Nursa Front, a U.S. designated foreign terrorist

organization, has been blamed for much of the sectarian rhetoric and

violence, but dozens of the opposition groups ascribe to Islamist or

Salafist-jihadist ideologies and mingle with the Free Syrian Army--

which the U.S. may now be supporting.

Over the last three years, the United States has committed to

providing $250 million to various opposition groups in Syria\\--at least

$117 million of which has already been funded, largely to the National

Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces. With the chemical

weapon red line crossed, the Administration has also agreed to provide

ammunition and small arms.

It is not clear whether any of this new lethal assistance will go to

the Free Syrian Army and its worrisome opposition groups.

The Administration has also committed to send an additional $300

million in humanitarian aid to \\\`\\\`vulnerable groups'' in and surrounding

Syria. It is not clear whether distribution of this aid will be

informed by the plight of religious minorities.

I am very concerned that the Administration may not be taking

seriously the targeting of religious minorities. Too often, we have

heard from this Administration that they have bigger issues to deal

with than the vulnerability of religious minorities.

In the last two appropriations cycles, we have directed the

Administration to condition aid to Egypt ($1.3 billion dollars) on

certification that Egypt is acting to protect the religious freedom of

its minorities. The Administration (both Secretaries Clinton and Kerry)

refused to do so. Perhaps not surprisingly, the government of Egypt

continues to allow attacks on Coptic Christians with impunity.

Money talks. The United States should be using assistance to ensure

recipient countries and entities have a plan that is implemented to

protect vulnerable religious minorities. This is all the more critical

in situations like Syria, where we are providing lethal aid in what has

become sectarian tinderbox.

&nbsp;

المعلومات الأساسية

تاريخ الصدور

2013/06/26

iranDocument

لا

نوع الوثيقة

كلمة / إحاطة

اللغة

الإنجليزية

كود الذاكرة السورية

SMI/A200/571264

وثائق أخرى للجهة المصدرة

UKRAINE; Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 43

نوع الوثيقة:

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الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/03/10

Syria (Executive Session); Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 22

نوع الوثيقة:

كلمة / إحاطة

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/02/03

Foreign Policy (Executive Calendar); Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 55

نوع الوثيقة:

كلمة / إحاطة

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/03/29

Expressing the sense of the Senate condemning the Russian Federation

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/03/15

COMMEMORATING THE 11-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA; Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 54

نوع الوثيقة:

كلمة / إحاطة

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/03/28

H.R.7276 — 117th Congress (2021-2022)

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/04/07

H.Res.1038 — 117th Congress (2021-2022)

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/04/06

شهادة أندرو إكسوم (Andrew Exum) نائب مساعد وزير الدفاع لسياسات الشرق الأوسط أمام الكونغرس حول الاتفاق مع روسيا لمنع سقوط نظام الأسد 

نوع الوثيقة:

شهادة

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2019/05/09

UKRAINE INVASION WAR CRIMES DETERRENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT; Congressional Record Vol. 168, No. 61

نوع الوثيقة:

كلمة / إحاطة

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/04/06

Recognizing the 11th anniversary of the Syrian revolution against Bashar al-Assad.

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

مجلس النواب الأمريكي - الكونغرس الأمريكي

تاريخ الصدور:

2022/03/15

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درجة الموثوقية:

الوثيقة

  • صحيحة
  • غير صحيحة
  • لم يتم التأكد من صحتها
  • غير محدد