RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN SYRIA: CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE; Congressional Record Vol. 159, No. 93
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RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN SYRIA: CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE
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HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH
of new jersey
in the house of representatives
Wednesday, June 26, 2013
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, I chaired a joint
hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human
Rights, and International Organizations and the Subcommittee on the
Middle East and North Africa. We turned our attention to an overlooked
aspect of the crisis in Syria\\--the religious minorities caught in the
middle of the conflict and apparently targeted by government forces as
well as rebel groups.
More than 93,000 Syrians have been killed in this horrendous and
seemingly endless civil war. More than 4.25 million people are
displaced within Syria, with millions more fleeing to safety in the
surrounding countries of Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq. It is
disturbing to note that one in five of the refugees is Christian
although Christians in Syria make-up one in ten of the pre-war
population of 22 million people. This would seem to indicate that
Christians are even more fearful for their lives and safety than other
segments of the Syrian population.
Before the war, Syria was a fairly pluralistic society, with
Alawites, Shias, Ismailis, Yezidis, Druze, Christians, Jews, and Sunnis
living in relative peace, side by side. The situation was far from
perfect, as President Bashar al Assad's regime had a vast security
apparatus in place with members inside each of the religious
communities to monitor their activities.
The Assad government was guilty of serious human rights violations,
including the summary imprisonment and execution of political
opponents. But relations between the various religious groups were
generally not violent.
That civil co-existence has ended with the war. In February of this
year, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic reported that, \\\`\\\`The conflict has become
increasingly sectarian, with the conduct of the parties becoming
significantly more radicalized and militarized.''
This followed on an earlier Commission report stating that, \\\`\\\`Entire
communities are at risk of being forced out of the country or of being
killed inside the country. With communities believing--not without
cause--that they face an existential threat. . . .''
We know that early in the civil war, Assad came to view the
Christian minority with suspicion, accusing churches of laundering
money and goods for opposition forces and forbidding banks from
transactions for certain churches.
There is also evidence that the Assad regime encouraged sectarian
tensions in order to maintain power--perhaps believing that if the
people were afraid of Islamists commandeering a nominally secular
state, the people would be more likely to support Assad over the
opposition.
In December 2012, Time Magazine reported allegations that the Assad
regime was paying individuals to pose as opposition supporters and
chant slogans at protests including \\\`\\\`The Christians to Beirut, the
Alawites to the grave.''
Our own government has voiced concern about the particular threat
posed to Christians
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in Syria. According to the State Department's International Religious
Freedom Report for 2012, \\\`\\\`The regime continued to frame opposition
actions as targeting the Christian population. At the same time, it
increased its own targeting of Christian and Alawi anti-regime
activists in order to eliminate minority-voices that might counter its
narrative of 'Sunni-Sponsored violence'.''
Religious minorities seem to fear the opposition forces. Some
prominent opposition groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) have a
religious basis which has been seen as threatening to Syria's Alawite
and Christian minorities.
Smaller opposition factions, such as the al-Qaeda-affiliated
jihadist al-Nusra Front, take explicitly sectarian positions. There are
reports of incidents in which rebel forces engaged in sectarian
violence, such as burning Shi'ite mosques.
Christians are perceived by many in the opposition to be Assad
loyalists, possibly due to Assad's aggressive recruitment of Christians
into the regime militias at the start of the civil war. Other reports
indicate that the Christians attempted to remain neutral either out of
pacifism or concern about their rights under opposition forces.
Christian neutrality was perceived by some opposition groups as
loyalty to the regime. In December 2012, a rebel force believed to be
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood released a Youtube video
entitled, \\\`\\\`Warning mainly Christian cities in the province of Hama'',
and promising attacks if they continue to support and house the pro-
Assad forces.
Christian leaders have been targeted, such as the April 2013
kidnapping of Mor Gregiorius Yohanna Ibrahim of the Syriac Orthodox
Church and Bishop Boulos Yazigi of the Greek Orthodox Church-both men
still have not been returned.
The Druze community reports being targeted as well. In March 2013, a
Druze leader reported to Christian Solidarity International, \\\`\\\`Our
people get stopped at checkpoints and are asked which sect they belong
to. Once the militias hear that they are from Swaida \\\[a province where
90% of the population is Druze\\\], our men disappear.''
The al-Nursa Front, a U.S. designated foreign terrorist
organization, has been blamed for much of the sectarian rhetoric and
violence, but dozens of the opposition groups ascribe to Islamist or
Salafist-jihadist ideologies and mingle with the Free Syrian Army--
which the U.S. may now be supporting.
Over the last three years, the United States has committed to
providing $250 million to various opposition groups in Syria\\--at least
$117 million of which has already been funded, largely to the National
Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces. With the chemical
weapon red line crossed, the Administration has also agreed to provide
ammunition and small arms.
It is not clear whether any of this new lethal assistance will go to
the Free Syrian Army and its worrisome opposition groups.
The Administration has also committed to send an additional $300
million in humanitarian aid to \\\`\\\`vulnerable groups'' in and surrounding
Syria. It is not clear whether distribution of this aid will be
informed by the plight of religious minorities.
I am very concerned that the Administration may not be taking
seriously the targeting of religious minorities. Too often, we have
heard from this Administration that they have bigger issues to deal
with than the vulnerability of religious minorities.
In the last two appropriations cycles, we have directed the
Administration to condition aid to Egypt ($1.3 billion dollars) on
certification that Egypt is acting to protect the religious freedom of
its minorities. The Administration (both Secretaries Clinton and Kerry)
refused to do so. Perhaps not surprisingly, the government of Egypt
continues to allow attacks on Coptic Christians with impunity.
Money talks. The United States should be using assistance to ensure
recipient countries and entities have a plan that is implemented to
protect vulnerable religious minorities. This is all the more critical
in situations like Syria, where we are providing lethal aid in what has
become sectarian tinderbox.
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