Senate Committee Print 112-39 - SYRIA: HUMANITARIAN AID MAY NO LONGER BE ENOUGH

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SYRIA: HUMANITARIAN AID

MAY NO LONGER BE ENOUGH

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A MINORITY STAFF REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

One Hundred Twelfth Congress

Second Session

September 19, 2012 deg.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

76-002 WASHINGTON : 2012

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho

ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida

JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming

TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah

William C. Danvers, Staff Director

Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director

(ii)

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C O N T E N T S

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Page

Letter of Transmittal............................................ v

Summary.......................................................... 1

Background....................................................... 2

Financial Situation.............................................. 3

Lebanon.......................................................... 3

Jordan........................................................... 4

Turkey........................................................... 6

Syria............................................................ 7

Conclusion....................................................... 10

Map--\\\`\\\`Syria: Numbers and Locations of People Fleeing Internal

Violence''..................................................... 12

(iii)

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

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United States Senate,

Committee on Foreign Relations,

Washington, DC, September 19, 2012.

Dear Colleagues: The transitions in the Middle East as part

of the \\\`\\\`Arab Spring'' have been relatively peaceful--except in

Syria, where more than 20,000 have been killed in fighting

between forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad and those rising up

against him. Not only have thousands been killed, hundreds of

thousands of refugees have fled across Syria's borders and more

than one million Internally Displaced Persons seek shelter with

family and friends inside Syria either as they flee the

fighting or because their homes and livelihoods have been

destroyed.

Syria's neighbors are greatly impacted as refugees stream

across borders looking for food and shelter. The situation is

even more complicated as some nations allow opposition forces

to recuperate inside their borders before returning to Syria to

re-engage in the fighting. Allegations of arms shipments and

possible training of anti-Assad forces muddy the waters

further.

Policy makers must recognize that Assad continues in power

primarily because he has the full military and financial

backing of Iran and the diplomatic support of Russia and China

which have successfully blocked any major action against Syria

in the United Nations Security Council. With Iraq (which is

roughly two-thirds Shiite Muslim) leaning more and more to

Tehran as a natural co-religionist ally, Iran's influence under

the current circumstances could create a crescent of power

running from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Tehran.

Syria is a majority Sunni state, yet is ruled by Assad who

is a Shia-affiliated Alawi. Alawis comprise only 10 percent of

Syria's population. Sensing his weakness, and wanting to aid

their fellow Sunnis, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have begun to

send arms to Assad's opponents. Turkey has demonstrated its

willingness to allow the use of its territory as a base for the

Syrian opposition, or to at least turn a blind eye. Syria has

thus become a proxy war against Iran.

In the midst of this, more than 250,000 refugees have fled

Syria to neighboring countries, each of which offers a varying

mixture of tolerance, indifference and active assistance either

through their own governments or the international community.

Providing them food, shelter and security is beginning to

strain both the international community and the host countries

which have their own economic and domestic political pressures.

(v)

Almost all parties agree that bringing the crisis in Syria

to a rapid conclusion by removing Assad from power is in

everyone's best interest as it will allow refugees to return

and hopefully diminish the role of armed groups in forming a

new government. Original hopes that he would go quietly into

exile have been shattered as the brutality of his forces makes

military defeat the only real alternative. One of the biggest

unknowns is whether Syrians will refrain from mass retribution

against the entire Alawi community for \\\`\\\`guilt by association''

with Assad and his cronies. Paradoxically, such possible wide-

scale violence not only threatens to turn Syria into another

faction-riven state such as today's Lebanon, but the fear of

massacres is one of the tools Assad is using to convince his

fellow Alawis to fight with him to the end.

In order to understand the situation on the ground more

fully and to assess the possible options for U.S. policy, I

asked Paul Foldi of my Foreign Relations Committee staff to

visit the region. He traveled to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey

August 29-September 8. As detailed more fully in the following

report, Mr. Foldi found there are three possible courses for

future U.S. action, each with risks and benefits.

Continue supplying humanitarian aid only.--This would keep

the U.S. out of the conflict. But some argue that, as

happened in Bosnia, our decision not to take sides in

spite of a clear preponderance of aggression on the

part of one side prolongs the suffering and allows the

malefactors to commit even greater human rights

violations. In this case, Assad long ago threw away any

bid for international support with indiscriminant

shelling, bombing and killing of civilians.

Impose a no fly zone.--Supporters say it will provide both

a humanitarian safe haven for refugees and neutralize

the value of Assad's superior fighter planes, bombers

and helicopters. Critics point out that Assad's highly

capable air defenses would make enforcement costly and

potentially lethal and that similar zones in Iraq did

nothing to assist Saddam's opponents.

Train and arm the opposition.--Saudi Arabia and Qatar are

already providing light arms, but in order to allow

anti-Assad forces to succeed, they will need to be able

to neutralize his air power with anti-aircraft weapons.

The U.S. has provided such equipment to other

insurgents in the past with mixed results. In this

case, Turkey would be especially leery that such arms

might fall into the hands of guerilla groups it is

already fighting.

I hope you will find this report useful as we attempt to

address this crisis.

Sincerely,

Richard G. Lugar,

Ranking Member.

SYRIA: HUMANITARIAN AID MAY

NO LONGER BE ENOUGH

Summary

More than an estimated 250,000 Syrian refugees are now

testing the stability of its neighbors Lebanon, Jordan and

Turkey. While each country has its own strains, Jordan is the

nearest to an actual breaking point both financially and on the

humanitarian front. Turkey has valiantly tried to handle the

issue on its own but it must now ask for more and more

international assistance. Somewhat surprisingly, Lebanon, with

its already chaotic sectarian issues, seems the least impacted

by the refugees for now. Nonetheless, if allowed to continue,

governments in Jordan certainly, and Turkey possibly, could

fall if refugee waves continue.

Foreign Relations Committee staff traveled to each of these

countries to meet with local political leaders, international

aid workers and NGOs, and American State Department officials

to assess the crisis. Visits and meetings were held in Beirut,

Lebanon; Amman, Jordan, Za'atri and Cyber City Refugee Camps in

Jordan; Istanbul, Turkey, Turkish Refugee Camps in Hatay

Province next to the Syrian border, and Ankara, Turkey, from

August 29 to September 8, 2012.

With Saudi Arabia and Qatar supplying arms for Assad's

loose-knit opponents known as the Free Syria Army and Iran

fully supporting Assad with weapons and funds, this civil war

has, de facto, become a proxy war against Iran. U.S. policy

makers must now decide if the potential for regional

destabilization as a result of unabated refugee flows will be

less costly in long run than greater U.S. military involvement

in the short run--either through a NATO No-Fly-Zone (originally

requested by Turkey) or more significant arms and training to

the FSA than they currently receive. Risks are inherent either

way. A prolonged war, in addition to the mounting humanitarian

costs, will also permit the increased entrenched

factionalization of both the military and political opposition.

NATO involvement will be costly in terms of armaments expended

and possible causalities or prisoners. U.S.-provided weapons

and training may drag other nations into the conflict and could

result in arms falling into the wrong hands.

Background

(in millions)

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New Syrian Existing

Total Refugees/ Iraqi Palestinians

Population IDPs Refugees

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Syria\\\\1\\\\ 21 1.2 1.0 0.5

Lebanon 4.3 0.070 0.1 0.450

Jordan 6.2 0.087 0.4 2.0

Turkey 0.75 0.080 nominal N/A

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\\\\1\\\\ Figures come from USAID Syria Fact Sheet # 3; September 5, 2012:

http://transition.usaid.gov/our\\\_work/humanitarian\\\_assistance/

disaster\\\_assistance/countries/syria/template/fs\\\_sr/fy2012/

syria\\\_ce\\\_fs03\\\_09-05-2012.pdf

August saw the highest monthly outflow of refugees from

Syria\\--over 100,000. The actual number for each country

fluctuates wildly (\\\`\\\`official\\\`\\\` numbers come from the U.N. High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) list of registered refugees,

but because there are no visa requirements for Syrians to enter

these three countries, these numbers are undoubtedly low; some

say as many as 140,000 are currently in Jordan). Many refugees

arrive wounded, either because they were fired upon by Syrian

security forces as they attempted to escape or because they are

wounded combatants. Border crossings open and close with great

irregularity, forcing many refugees to use as active or

abandoned smuggling routes, gaps in fences where fences exist,

or just crossing miles of trackless desert. There are even

reports of refugees wounded in minefields along parts of the

border.\\\\2\\\\

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\\\\2\\\\ See the State Department's Humanitarian Information Unit's map

from September 12, 2012 at the end of this report for more information.

Updated maps and information can be found at https://hiu.state.gov/

pages/home.aspx

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Depending on the security situation, many Syrian refugees

return home temporarily to check on family (or fight) and

depart again when the situation deteriorates. This transient

aspect of the refugees can result in double or even triple

counting. In addition to this recent influx, Lebanon and Jordan

are host to large number of Iraqis displaced in the last decade

and Palestinians who arrived decades ago and who have remained

for the multiple generations that have been born since.

Most Syrian refugees in Lebanon are not in camps but live

with family members, friends, or rent housing. In Turkey,

refugees are mainly in well laid out camps (some tents, many in

converted/subdivided warehouses) with older camps near the

border, newer ones farther away. Jordan has a mix, though

almost all new arrivals are going into camps (the largest of

25,000+ is a dusty, desolate U.N. camp called Za'atri that

staff visited). Roaming Syrian populations inside their own

country (Internally Displaced Persons \\\`\\\`IDPs'') cluster near

the Turkish border awaiting entry or seeking protection or

shelter with relations in other parts of Syria.

As with all refugee situations, children are the most

vulnerable and stressed, both in terms of missing parents and

inadequate educational/recreational opportunities. Bored

children, especially adolescents, trapped inside walled or

fenced facilities are particularly prone to venting their

frustration through violence when cajoled or provoked by a few

malcontents. Soccer balls and school books are just as

necessary as food and shelter.

Financial Situation

To date the U.S. has offered $103 million in regional

assistance, primarily to the World Food Program (WFP) and to

the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The U.S. also

just finalized $100 million in Direct Budget Support to

Jordan.\\\\3\\\\ Jordan, always cash-strapped, has still not received

the $1 billion in direct support it gets every year from Saudi

Arabia, and the government, in conjunction with the U.N.,

issued an international appeal at the beginning of September

for $700 million to help with the crisis.\\\\4\\\\ Turkey has spent

more than $300 million of its own resources on the refugees. It

is unclear when Assad will run out of money. Estimates

fluctuate wildly, and some speculate he will be broke by the

end of the year due to a burn rate of up to $1billion/month,

but these figures are pure guesswork at this point. Others

contend he has money squirreled away or that Iran might be

willing to fund him.

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\\\\3\\\\ http://jordan.usembassy.gov/pr\\\_100\\\_million\\\_asst\\\_072212.html

\\\\4\\\\ \\\`\\\`Jordan, U.N. Appeal for $700 Million To Help Deal With

Refugees'' Washington Post; September 1, 2012: http://

www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle--east/jordan-un-appeal-for-700-

million-to-help-deal-with-influx-of-syrian-refugees/2012/09/01/

d544891c-f431-11e1-b74c-84ed55e0300b\\\_story.html

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Lebanon

Lebanon's capital Beirut remains relatively calm due in

part to the government's official policy of \\\`\\\`disassociation''

with the Syrian crisis--a policy brought about because Iran's

client Hezbollah forms part of the Lebanese government. This

policy has not prevented sectarian fighting from spilling over

into Tripoli in the north as rivals mirror the fighting just

across the border. Occasionally, cross-border firing and even

shelling has taken place, so far with no major consequences.

Lebanon's politics are so chaotic that the Syrian refugees are

actually a boon to business. An earlier spate of kidnappings of

Lebanese inside Syria resulted in tit-for-tat kidnappings

inside Lebanon. This led most Gulf countries to urge their

citizens to flee or to avoid tourism-dependent Lebanon. Well-

off Syrian refugees have filled much of that void, renting

vacant apartments with year-long leases, to the point that

rents are escalating. For those without such funds, Lebanon was

able to convert many empty schools into temporary shelters, yet

school is about to start and it is not clear where those

families will move to once displaced.\\\\5\\\\

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\\\\5\\\\ \\\`\\\`Aid Agencies Scrambling to Relocate Refugees from Schools''

Voice of America: August 31, 2012: http://www.voanews.com/content/aid-

agencies-scramblint-to-relocate-refugees-from-syrian-schools/

1499528.html

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Lebanon's multi-racial/multi-ethnic nature resulting from

intermarriages between tribes and sects has created safe-havens

for those Syrians who are able to stay with family. Depending

on the level of Syrian military/police checkpoints--some of

which require a bribe to pass and some which do not--as well as

Hezbollah checkpoints in Lebanon's eastern Bekaa Valley,

Damascus to Beirut is but a short, 50 mile car ride. This

proximity has allowed many Syrians to return temporarily to

their capital or nearby towns.

Palestinian issues continue to plague Lebanon. Funds are

still lacking for the final rebuilding phase of a large section

of an UNRWA \\\`\\\`camp'' (no tents, but an entire urban

neighborhood) that was destroyed by the Lebanese army in 2007

in a firefight which displaced 30,000.\\\\6\\\\ Palestinians had

limited property and work rights in Syria; they have far fewer

in Lebanon. Housing options for them are limited absent the

rebuilding of the destroyed neighborhood and as Palestinians,

according to treaty, can only receive assistance from UNRWA,

not UNHCR.

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\\\\6\\\\ Reconstruction of the Nahrel-Bared Camp & UNRWA Compound:

http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011042974549.pdf

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Jordan

U.S. Embassy officials praised the Jordanian Armed Forces

(JAF) for doing all it can to assist Syrian refugees. The JAF

welcomes them at the border, and in the beginning, men and

officers fed refugees out of their own rations. The U.S.

Department of Defense (DoD) is now providing JAF with

additional humanitarian equipment to assist with refugee

management. Wide-scale allegations of Jordanian authorities

seizing refugee travel docs are denied by the government. Such

allegations are no surprise and indeed may have occurred early

in the crisis as overwhelmed border officials quite conceivably

tossed passports/ID cards into boxes with the hopes of sorting

them out later. However, the matter now needs to be redressed

quickly--both to return rightful property but, more

importantly, to allow Syrians needed documents to return home.

Jordan's scarce water resources are strained under any

conditions and many have long blamed Syria for stealing more

than its share from the Yarmouk tributary of the Jordan River

that forms the north-west most portion of the Jordan's border

with Syria. Hosting 100,000+ Syrians will only compound this,

especially as many Syrians appear not always sympathetic to the

demands of water conservation required in Jordan's more arid

environment. Additionally, Jordan's sluggish economy and

allegations of high-level economic corruption are straining

domestic forces. This could easily lead to either 1) the

refugees rioting themselves over mistreatment or 2) inflame

popular protests against a king and government that is

perceived as aiding refugees while ignoring the plight of its

own citizens. While the King seems to understand the message

behind the Arab Spring, he has not been able to make sufficient

reforms to quell growing unrest. To compensate, or, as his

domestic critics would charge, curry favor in order to prop up

his rule, King Abdullah has been extremely accommodating to

U.S. requests during this crisis.

Even Jordan, with its long history of tolerating large

foreign-born populations, has its limits. Thus some six weeks

ago it began planning a massive camp to house the latest influx

of refugees. Called Za'atri, and located near Jordan's north-

west border with Syria, the camp has ballooned to well over

25,000 refugees with upwards of 1,000 arriving daily.

Administered by UNHCR with help from UNICEF, the World Food

Program (WFP), Save the Children and a host of other donors,

the tented camp quickly got out of hand. Conditions in the

older half of the camp are particularly dire as well-meaning

engineers graded the ground to allow for flat surfaces, but

this only displaced the thin layer of topsoil and created a

desolate and dusty environment instead. The U.S., particularly

DoD, was able to apply some rapid funding to procure truckloads

of gravel which are now being used in the newer portions of the

camp (called Za'atri 2, 3, etc.) and keep the dust down quite

well. Many of the refugees are from Syria's upper and middle

class. Staff spoke with lawyers and doctors who fled with

nothing but who are beginning to chafe at their conditions.

At Za'atri, the food and water demands of the camp are

insatiable and are straining relations with nearby towns and

villages which fear that scarce resources will soon disappear.

Communal kitchens are being constructed in Za'atri to alleviate

the current dietary monotony, but establishing a food voucher

system to allow camp residents to purchase what they want to

cook will take time. Refugees are provided with a solar powered

lamp, mattresses, blankets and a few other household items.

Latrines and showers use gravity tanks and are surprisingly

hygienic given the environment and constant usage. Security is

an issue as an earlier riot injured several police officers

(who, with great discipline, refused to attack the mob), but

the police now refuse to patrol the camp.

A lucky few families have small 9x18 single room trailers

instead of tents. While these provide better living than tents,

it is a matter of scale. The trailers are more permanent, and

could be transported back to Syria if needed; however, for the

price of one trailer, UNHCR can provide 4-5 tents. The approach

of winter--bitterly cold in the desert--also means additional

resources will have to be spent for heaters and extra tarps to

winterize tents.

Dust covered UNCHR tents in the original Za'atri camp

(left) Container housing in Za'atri (right) Za'atri 2 Camp with U.S.-

provided gravel keeps the dust down

Turkey

Turkey's huge population means the actual number of

refugees (or \\\`\\\`guests'' as they are officially called;

\\\`\\\`refugees'' is a loaded word for the Turks and verboten) is

statistically insignificant. Turkey has spent $300 million thus

far supporting these guests (MFA officials quoted $10 million

to build a camp to house 10,000 and $3 million/month to operate

it). Meanwhile the opposition party goads the government daily

either for not doing enough to help the refugees or for

questioning the abrupt about face on the country's formally

cozy ties with the Assad regime. (Some observers believe

Turkey's current stance against Syria is personal and comes

from the rebuff Assad gave to Turkish PM Erdogan's suggestions

to Assad for democratic reforms following the Arab Spring.)

Turkey originally created a Cadillac of a camp when the

refugee waves first hit. This is understandable for several

reasons. Turkey's economy is booming, and the country wanted to

show off its wealth and prestige accordingly.

As the refuges continued to pour in, the Turks scaled back

subsequent efforts, but compared to Za'atri, the camps in

Turkey are still upscale. Staff visited an abandoned two-story

warehouse that had been subdivided using sheetrock/drywall into

multiple units, each with a door and window facing a common

hall, with a stove and water jug, as well as an operating

electric fan. While not paradise by any means, it is miles

above Za'atri. Refugees are allowed to leave camp from 8am-8pm

and local press reports said they were a boon to the Turkish

agricultural industry. Those with money they brought or from

friends were able to outfit their rooms as needed and one had

even purchased an air conditioner.

Turkey's initial go-it-alone attitude has begun to waver,

and the government let it be known that 100,000 refugees was a

red-line for the government. Turkey recently asked UNHCR to

become more involved in planning future sites, which UNHCR

contends must be farther from the border--at least one day's

walk--as this deters those inside from using a camp as a base

of operations. UNHCR told staff that one current camp in Turkey

was even found to have a tunnel under the border into Syria, it

was so close.

A Turkish warehouse converted to house Syrian \\\`\\\`guests''

Keeping camps for refugees and not as an R-and-R spot for

opposition fighters will not only allow better internal

controls, but ensure the safety of non-combatants in the camp,

according to UNHCR. Turkey's most recent efforts to move those

refugees living in rented homes near the Syrian border into

camps reflects Ankara's desire to know exactly who is inside

their borders.\\\\7\\\\ However, any Turkish attempts to restrict

young males from popping in and out of Syria\\--whether to fight

or to check on family--will no doubt increase tensions inside

the camps.

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\\\\7\\\\ \\\`\\\`Turkey Shifts Syrian Refugees From Borders'' Voice of

America, September 13, 2012: http://www.voanews.com/content/

turkey\\\_shifts\\\_syrian\\\_refugees\\\_from\\\_broders/1507286.html

In hopes of limiting the number of Syrian \\\`\\\`guests,''

Turkey has begun a novel approach known as \\\`\\\`Zero Point

Distribution.'' Food and basic hygiene necessities are left

right at the Syrian border (i.e.--the Zero Point) with the hope

that Syrians will be able to subsist off this assistance yet

remain in Syria. Staff visited a Zero Point distribution center

located only a mile from the border and run by the Turkish Red

Crescent which stockpiled bottled water, prepackaged boxes of

food, even bags of American rice purchased on the local market.

The aid is dropped off along the border, but not near official

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crossings where it might fall into Syrian government hands.

Syria

The U.S. must decide the extent to which it wants to

participate in the on-going proxy war against Iran, which is

what Syria has become thanks to assistance from Saudi Arabia

and Qatar to the Free Syria Army (FSA) versus Iranian\\\\8\\\\ (some

add Chinese, possibly Russian) assistance to Syria. Defeating

Assad is beating Tehran. With Iraq leaning ever more towards

its Shiite neighbor to the East, it is in no one's interest to

allow Tehran to have a geopolitical and actual terrorist

crescent running from Tehran to Hezbollah/Hamas.

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\\\\8\\\\ \\\`\\\`Iran's Revolutionary Guards Commander Says Its Troops In

Syria" Reuters, September 16, 2012: http://www.reuters.com/article/

2012/09/16/us-iran-syria\\-presence-idUSBRE88F04C2 0120916

The U.S. so far has engaged officially only in humanitarian

assistance (though some press reporting suggests otherwise.)

\\\\9\\\\ However much the current levels of humanitarian and

financial assistance are appreciated by senior politicians in

the region, the populace little knows of U.S. efforts because

it comes either as direct bilateral budgetary support or is

diluted with other funds through U.N. agencies. Even though

they have delivered only a few, the Saudi's promise of

thousands of temporary trailers to shelter refugees has earned

them wide praise in the Jordanian street.

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\\\\9\\\\ \\\`\\\`CIA Said To Be Steering Arms To Syrian Opposition'' New York

Times; June 21, 2012: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/

middleeast/cia-said-to-aid-in-steering-arms-to-syrian-

rebels.html?pagewanted=all

Some argue that more overt U.S. assistance for the FSA will

counter the perception that we did nothing to help oust

Mubarak; these observers also contend U.S. military help would

keep the FSA from being too beholden to Saudi and Qatari

Wahhabists. Others say that, as recent tragic events suggest,

our efforts in Libya have borne little pro-U.S. fruit and that

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we could expect the same in Syria.

There is no question the FSA is a loose coalition of forces

whose only unifying factor is a desire to oust Assad via

military means now that it is clear he will not go quietly. The

FSA runs the gamut of idealistic students who took up arms

after their peaceful demonstrations were fired upon to foreign

Al Qaeda fighters looking for action to help their Sunni

brethren. In between are Syrian army defectors, shop keepers

and every other stratum of Syrian society.

Politically, the opposition is just as splintered. The most

prominent is the Syrian National Conference (SNC); however, the

SNC is viewed inside Syria as a bunch of ex-pats who jet around

the world decrying the situation but who are unable to provide

the FSA with either weapons or funds from the Syrian diaspora

or donor communities, and at the same time refuse to die in the

rubble with the FSA. Given this military and political Tower of

Babel, the real danger exists that an Assad-free Syria\\--far

from controlling Lebanon as it used to--will become another

Lebanon as those with the guns will make the rules.

A gym near the Turkish/Syria border converted to a warehouse to store

items for Turkish Red Crescent's \\\`\\\`Zero Point Distribution''

While staff heard from younger FSA members and some in the

SNC that Assad's exit will bring an abrupt peace, most Syria

watchers believe that the fighting is now tribal and sectarian.

One interlocutor told staff of a comment from a foreign contact

of Assad's. \\\`\\\`Before Ramadan in 2011, I was speaking to the

leader of Syria; after Ramadan, I was speaking to the leaders

of the Alawites.'' While they comprise barely 10% of Syria's

population, virtually all military and political power

concentrated in Alawite hands. As such, most observers believe

they will now fight to the death to maintain power, and that

their brutality to date means--regardless of their role--almost

all will be rounded up and killed when Assad is defeated. Such

a scenario is also used by Assad to sustain the Alawites in

their fight against the opposition as he warns fellow clansmen

they are in a literal matter of life and death.

To combat the current political fragmentation, the U.S.

State Department, through its Istanbul-based OSOS (Office of

Syrian Opposition Support--a creation of State's bureau of

Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)) is training Syrian

activists in the use of secure communications and providing

them with Arabic-language laptops and mobile satellite up-

links.\\\\10\\\\ This training is based upon the Obama

administration's policy of \\\`\\\`non-lethal aid for non-lethal

actors.'' The training--thus far in groups of a dozen--must be

held in Istanbul, a city of 10 plus million, in order to

provide both the trainers and the trainees greater anonymity.

While it is certainly more expensive to run the training from

Istanbul rather than closer to the border, this blending-in

allows OSOS to keep a low profile and maintain better security.

Trainers switch to another of the city's countless hotels every

few sessions; such anonymity would be impossible in the tiny,

tightly-knit villages near the border.

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\\\\10\\\\ Antennas provided are the size of dinner plates and therefore

easily hidden on rooftops or balconies.

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Younger trainees (all of whom must be smuggled from Syria

to Istanbul), however, want more than the limited data package

offered with the computer/antenna. The YouTube generation

believes it can win greater international support (and possibly

intervention) by continual uploading of graphic videos showing

Syrian atrocities. U.S. sponsored trainers stress there are

already enough videos out there. They argue, rather, the need

is to create nascent political networks using the equipment to

link up with fellow activists in neighboring towns (instead of

transmitting the large, and costly, video files which the OSOS

package will not support). Trainers dangle rewards of increased

data packages (which can be paid for in Istanbul) for activists

who contact OSOS upon their return to Syria and report on their

location, conditions, etc. OSOS will expand training to larger

classes and more direct democratic transition activities in the

coming weeks.

As the friction with OSOS's support demonstrates, Assad

opponents want more than just tents for refugees and laptops,

they want the means to remove him militarily. While it is clear

that Saudi Arabia and Qatar are providing arms to their Sunni

co-religionists (primarily via Turkey, where U.S. press reports

suggest the CIA is also involved in vetting and training),

these light arms cannot counter Assad's superiority in

artillery and fixed and rotary-wing air power. FSA and other

forces want either a no-fly zone or the firepower to create

their own.\\\\11\\\\

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\\\\11\\\\ \\\`\\\`Syrian Rebels Get Influx Of Arms With Gulf Neighbors''

money, U.S. coordination" Washington Post; May 15, 2012: http://

www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrian-rebels-get-

influx-of-arms-with-gulf-neighbors-money-us-coordination/2012/05/15/

gIQAds2TSU\\\_story.html; "Turkey Calls For No Fly Zone" CBSNews.com;

August 31, 2012: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202--162-57504064/turkey-

calls-for-syria\\-safe-zones-u.n-security-council-remains-unmoved/

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Some interlocutors staff spoke with contested the current

DC-think which holds that a no-fly zone (NFZ) inside Syria is

militarily impossible because Assad's air defenses are too

tough. Supporters of a NFZ point out that most Syrian anti-

aircraft assets are concentrated near Damascus and while

certainly not insignificant, are of an older Soviet quality.

Thus, they say, an NFZ in the northwest of the country,

including Aleppo, is not impossible. Opponents of a NFZ point

to our experience in Iraq where decade-long northern and

southern NFZs did little to allow Saddam's opponents to over-

throw him. They contend that a NFZ will do little to create a

tipping point in favor of the FSA.

The Turks do not want to impose a NFZ on their own for the

same geo-political reason they do not wish to intercede alone

on the ground to create a humanitarian Safe Zone: fear of

allowing Assad to shift the fighting from Syrian-on-Syrian to

Arab versus the dreaded Turk/Ottoman Empire of long ago.

However, Turkey seems perfectly willing to play a greater role,

as long as it has the political cover to do so. With continued

Russian and Chinese obstruction in the U.N. Security Council,

the only option would therefore be NATO. The June loss of a

Turkish reconnaissance fighter over the Mediterranean had the

potential to become a Gulf of Tonkin moment as Turkey quickly

accepted Syrian claims to have shot it down, but NATO declined

to get more involved.\\\\12\\\\ The sunken jet was recently

discovered by the U.S. deep-sea robot company used to find the

Titanic.\\\\13\\\\ Mechanical failure is also a possible cause of the

crash, according to American interlocutors familiar with the

incident who cautioned about a rush to judgment.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\\\\12\\\\ \\\`\\\`Ankara Vows To Take \\\`Necessary Action' After Syria Shoots

Down Turkish Jet'' The Guardian (UK); June 23, 2012: http://

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/23/syria\\-shooting-down-turkish-jet

\\\\13\\\\ \\\`\\\`Exploration Vessel Nautilus Locates Downed Turkish Jet''

Ocean Exploration Trust; July 11, 2012: http://

oceanexplorationtrust.com/press/20120711\\\_Turkey.htm

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It is unclear if Ankara will continue to look for, or

foment, an incident that would draw in NATO, but Turkey clearly

has the military power to defeat Assad on its own. However, the

military and current government are at odds with one another as

hundreds of generals are on trial for an alleged 2003 coup

attempt. Given this, Turkish PM Erdogan is more likely to rely

on his Turkish National Intelligence Organization (TNIO)

instead to be the main contact with Syrian fighters inside

Turkey and to work with the Saudis and Qataris to receive the

arms shipments mentioned above and to turn them over to the

Free Syria Army.

Conclusion

With more than 20,000 dead so far in Syria, Assad must go

sooner rather than later. In addition to the humanitarian

catastrophe he has created, Syria's role as Iran's client has

endangered our allies in the area and led to its support of

groups actively seeking to kill Americans. America's current

policy of only providing humanitarian assistance addresses real

needs and is appreciated by our allies in the region. It does

not address the issue of shortening the conflict. A NATO-

imposed no fly zone might tilt the military advantage in favor

of the insurgents, but it may be deemed too costly or risky.

Another option is to provide the FSA with arms capable of

shooting down Syrian fixed and rotary wing aircraft. However,

our own experience in providing MANPADs to various groups over

the years has yielded mixed results. In this situation, Turkey

could balk for fear that these weapons would fall into the

hands of its Kurdish separatist insurgency--the PKK. Our own

fears of Al-Qaeda affiliates achieving the same are not

unwarranted. Supplying such weapons after careful vetting of

the recipients might level the field enough to allow the

uprising to succeed.

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