P10_TA(2025)0035 – The need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria – European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2025 on the need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria (2025/2569(RSP))

Official Journal

of the European Union

EN

C series

C/2025/3152

20.6.2025

P10_TA(2025)0035

The need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria

European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2025 on the need for EU support towards a just transition and

reconstruction in Syria (2025/2569(RSP))

(C/2025/3152)

The European Parliament,

—

having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) of 18 December 2015,

—

having regard to the establishment of the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab

Republic, under UN General Assembly Resolution 77/301 of 29 June 2023,

—

having regard to its recommendation of 28 February 2024 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of

the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in

Syria (1),

—

having regard to the statement by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 December

2024,

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 December 2024,

—

having regard to the orders of the Paris Judicial Court of 14 November 2023 and 21 January 2025 issuing

international arrest warrants for Bashar al-Assad and members of his family, and to universal jurisdiction cases in

European courts,

—

having regard to the joint statement by the Governments of France, Syria, Bahrain, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece,

Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and

the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, the Secretary General of the

League of Arab States and the Secretary General of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf of

13 February 2025,

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/406 of 24 February 2025 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP

concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (2),

—

having regard to the statement issued following Syria’s National Dialogue Conference, held in Damascus on

25 February 2025,

—

having regard to the statement of 8 March 2025 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service on the

latest developments in Syria,

—

having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas in December 2024 Syria witnessed momentous change, as a rebel coalition spearheaded by the armed group

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA), the Southern Operations Room (formerly Southern

Front) and several other opposition forces toppled Bashar al-Assad’s murderous regime; whereas the historic collapse

of the Assad dynasty marked the end of half of a century of suffering for the Syrian people, with unprecedented

tyranny and chaos unfolding after Bashar al-Assad brutally repressed the 2011 uprising and led the country into civil

war, as well as the beginning of a new chapter for the Syrian people and the broader Middle East;

B.

whereas the fallen Assad regime engaged in systematic repression, mass arrests, torture, enforced disappearances,

extrajudicial executions and other grave human rights violations, and is responsible for documented war crimes and

crimes against humanity, including the deliberate targeting of civilians, siege warfare leading to mass starvation, the

use of barrel bombs and the deployment of chemical weapons, in violation of international law; whereas since 2011,

at least half a million Syrians have died and 14 million have been forced to flee their homes, of which roughly

7 million have been internally displaced, as a result of the fierce repression and demographic engineering by the

Assad regime and his allies, as well as at the hands of terrorist groups; whereas the fates and whereabouts of tens of

thousands of people remain unknown;

(1) OJ C, C/2024/6749, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6749/oj.

(2) OJ L, 2025/406, 25.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/406/oj.

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C.

whereas Russia and Iran, under the guise of strategic alliances, were both enablers and active players in the war waged

by the bloody Assad regime against its own people and used Syria as a geopolitical battleground for destabilising the

region, as a hub for arms and drug trafficking, as well as a testing ground for military capabilities and tactics,

systematically targeting civilian infrastructure and humanitarian aid convoys in clear violation of international law;

whereas Assad’s power relied on Russia and Iran’s continued support and their supply of manpower and weapons,

as well as that of their proxies, including the Wagner Group, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and Afghan

mercenaries; whereas his sudden fall is a clear geostrategic defeat for both countries;

D.

whereas after assuming a leading role in overthrowing the regime, former HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa was

designated caretaker President and launched a political transition process, entailing plans for a new constitution and

the holding of elections in four to five years from now; whereas the caretaker president was tasked with forming a

temporary legislative council, appointed a caretaker government and pledged to establish, by early March 2025, a

new non-sectarian, comprehensive, credible and inclusive government reflecting Syria’s ethnic and religious

diversity; whereas on 24 and 25 February 2025, the Syrian interim government held the announced National

Dialogue Conference; whereas the Syrian constitution of 2012 was nullified and the People’s Assembly and the

Baath Party dissolved; whereas many armed groups also formally agreed to dissolve and be integrated into the Syrian

army;

E.

whereas the EU rightly refused to normalise its ties with the Assad regime right through to its demise and played a

significant role as a major humanitarian donor to Syrian civilians and as host to 1,3 million refugees fleeing the

conflicts; whereas since 2011, the EU and its Member States have mobilised more than EUR 33,3 billion in

humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance focusing on life-saving aid, resilience programmes

and the political implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015); whereas in December 2024 the EU

launched a humanitarian air bridge to deliver emergency healthcare and other essential supplies; whereas in the

aftermath of the fall of the Assad regime, some Member States announced a suspension of pending asylum

applications by Syrians; whereas the EU has suspended sanctions on key economic sectors to facilitate engagement

with Syria and its reconstruction;

F.

whereas the caretaker government authorities control most but not all of Syrian territory, with the overall security

situation in Syria remaining fragmented and volatile; whereas violent events, including revenge killings, sectarian

violence and criminal activities, are seen to be increasing, particularly in the coastal and rural areas; whereas proAssad armed groups and, allegedly, others have conducted coordinated attacks starting on 6 March 2025 in the

Latakia, Tartus and Homs governorates, leading to deadly clashes with Syrian security forces; whereas in return,

members of the Syrian security forces and the SNA, foreign fighters and jihadists reportedly participated in

unjustifiable retaliations and executions targeting Alawite civilians on the basis of their ethno-religious affiliation;

deplores also the confirmed killings of at least 10 Christians; whereas, despite the statement delivered by de facto

President al-Sharaa, the fighting lasted several days and has so far caused over 1 000 casualties; whereas de facto

President al-Shaara has announced the creation of a ‘fact-finding committee’ and of a ‘higher committee’;

G.

whereas north-eastern Syria is still currently administered by the self-proclaimed Autonomous Administration of

North and East Syria and controlled militarily by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); whereas on

10 March 2025 an agreement towards their integration within all institutions of the Syrian state was jointly signed

by de facto President al-Sharaa and Commander in Chief of the SDF Mazloum Abdi; whereas since December 2024,

the Turkish-backed SNA militias, some of which have not been included in the transitional government, and Türkiye

itself, have intensified attacks and incursions within northern Syrian territory, including attacks on civilians and

civilian infrastructure in the Manbij and Kobani areas, which may amount to war crimes;

H.

whereas Israel has occupied a part of the Syrian territory in the Golan Heights since 1967; whereas following the

overthrow of the Assad regime, Israel has further seized the UN-patrolled demilitarised zone beyond the Golan

Heights and repeatedly carried out strikes on military targets in Syria; whereas the Israeli Minister of Defence has

declared that ‘the IDF will remain at the summit of Mount Hermon and the security zone indefinitely’;

I.

whereas Russia seeks to retain its military bases in Syria, particularly the Tartus naval base and the Hmeimim military

airfield; whereas Bashar al-Assad and his family fled the country and have been granted political asylum in Russia;

whereas diplomatic contact has been made between Russia and the new Syrian authorities;

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J.

whereas the Assad regime supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recognised the occupied Luhansk and Donetsk

regions in Ukraine, as well as the Abkhazia region in Georgia; whereas Ukraine’s military intelligence service

systematically reported that Russia was training mercenaries recruited in Syria to support Russia’s war against

Ukraine; whereas the ‘Grain from Ukraine’ initiative was deployed in Syria after the suspension of Russian food

exports;

K.

whereas Daesh has caused tremendous suffering in Syria, triggered numerous terrorist attacks worldwide and

continues to operate within and from Syria, relying on its centre for external operational planning in the Badia

region; whereas approximately 10 000 Daesh fighters and 40 000 Daesh family members are currently being

detained in the Al-Hol and Roj detention facilities, primarily guarded by the Kurdish-led SDF; whereas Syrian

security forces may reportedly take over the management of the detention facilities following the agreement of

10 March 2025 made between de facto President al-Sharaa and SDF Commander in Chief Mazloum Abdi;

L.

whereas Syria’s Christian population has steeply declined since 2011 due to its targeting by both the Assad regime, as

well as by Daesh and other terrorist groups;

M.

whereas the situation in Syria remains one of the world’s most acute humanitarian crises, with nine out of ten Syrians

below the poverty line and almost 17 million people – 70 % of the population – requiring humanitarian assistance

because of widespread food insecurity and a lack of basic infrastructure and public services;

N.

whereas, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the humanitarian

response for Syria is significantly underfunded, having secured less than 10 % of the USD 1.2 billion needed until

March 2025; whereas the executive order issued by US President Donald Trump’s administration, enacting a 90-day

suspension of all foreign assistance programmes, including those administered by the United States Agency for

International Development (USAID), has and will have an impact on the humanitarian programmes and nongovernmental organisations that operate on the ground in Syria; whereas the UK and several EU Member States have

also announced significant decreases in their global aid budgets;

O.

whereas Syria finds itself in a tremendously dire economic situation, with soaring inflation in the country reaching a

record high level of 40,2 % in 2024, electricity shortages and rising commodity prices; whereas the collapse of the

Syrian economy was exacerbated by regime corruption, predatory economic policies and reliance on illicit activities,

including the production and trafficking of Captagon; whereas a colossal reconstruction effort must be undertaken

while navigating the shift to an open market economy, with exports having dramatically decreased compared to prewar levels;

P.

whereas 5,5 million Syrian refugees live in the five countries neighbouring Syria, namely Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan,

Iraq and Egypt, with the EU providing financial assistance to help shoulder the associated costs; whereas

approximately 500 000 internally displaced persons and 300 000 external refugees have returned to their areas of

origin since the collapse of the Assad regime, with inadequate services, limited livelihoods and damaged

infrastructure hindering their sustainable reintegration;

1.

Praises the bravery, dignity and resilience of the Syrian people, who finally succeeded in overthrowing the cruel Assad

dictatorship; pays tribute to the countless victims of the regime; calls for the EU to seize this historic opportunity to

support a Syrian-led political transition in order to unite and rebuild the country, and to assist Syria in implementing

its reconstruction and achieving a just and inclusive political transition; remains concerned, however, by the high

degree of instability, both in Syria and in the region; underlines that a stable and peaceful Syria is in the interests of

the Middle East, the EU’s southern neighbourhood and the EU itself;

2.

Welcomes the fresh start in EU-Syria relations, manifested by the appointment of an EU Chargé d’affaires in

Damascus, diplomatic engagement and high-level meetings undertaken by Member States and EU leaders, as well as

the anticipated organisation of the Ninth Brussels Conference set to take place on 17 March 2025; encourages the

EU and all its Member States to cooperate with Syria’s interim authorities in a transparent, coordinated and

responsible manner, and to convey readiness to provide state-building assistance if and as needed; welcomes

dialogue held alongside regional partners in the so-called ‘Aqaba’ format;

3.

Strongly believes that stability in Syria will come from a pluralistic political transition that includes credible

representatives of all components of Syrian society and of all geographical areas, that is to say all religious and ethnic

communities, women, civil society and peaceful opposition forces; welcomes the caretaker president’s

acknowledgement of Syria’s diversity while taking note that the composition of the current interim government is

lacking in this regard; underlines the importance of the future government reflecting this plurality and for a future

constitutional framework guaranteeing equal rights and access to opportunities for all Syrians, in line with

democratic principles, the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms, including religious freedom, as upheld by

international law, as well as clear and concrete evidence that these rights are respected in national and local decisions;

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4.

Acknowledges in this regard, the National Dialogue Conference that took place on 25 February 2025 as a starting

point for establishing a culture of dialogue for all Syrians; expresses its concern about the exclusion of Kurdish

political representatives, as well as the failure to ensure the participation of all segments of Syrian civil society,

particularly women; recalls, further, that this dialogue ought to be upheld in order to prevent deepening societal

divisions and discord within key segments of Syrian society and further destabilising an already fragile security

situation; calls on the interim government to craft a roadmap setting out its plan for carrying out the political

transition process and improve transparency in respect of Syrian citizens;

5.

Notes with concern the violent past of factions that toppled the Assad regime and are now participating in

government; takes good note of the caretaker President’s declarations of intent, while pledging to monitor the

actions of national and local authorities when evaluating further engagement; expresses cautious optimism

regarding the behaviour of the caretaker authorities regarding freedom of religion and encourages them to

implement further confidence-building measures; calls on the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security

Policy and the Member States to consistently speak out against any possible violation of fundamental freedoms and

human rights in Syria by the interim government or other groups;

6.

Is deeply worried by the fragile security situation across Syria, particularly the coastal area, and firmly condemns the

retaliatory targeting of the Alawite community based on its perceived association with the Assad regime; calls on the

caretaker authorities to rein in all violent factions, including those set to be incorporated within the Syrian army and

security forces, protect all civilian citizens from violence and ensure their right to live in safety; calls for prompt,

transparent and impartial investigations into all killings and other violations and for those responsible to be held to

account, in line with international legal norms and standards; urges the caretaker government to ensure that all

military and security appointments are based strictly on professional qualifications, respect for international human

rights and humanitarian law, and a commitment to combating terrorism; expresses concern regarding the presence

of foreign extremist fighters, including European citizens, among the forces that overthrew the Assad regime, and

cautions against integrating them permanently into the Syrian security apparatus; recognises the challenge for

orderly state-building linked to the risk of insurgency by armed groups loyal to the former regime; encourages

caretaker authorities to organise paramilitary and civilian disarmament;

7.

Praises the invaluable contribution of civil society, in Syria and abroad, as the legitimate repository and defender of

the aspirations of the Syrian people during years of brutal oppression; pays particular tribute to the White Helmets,

target of a regime-orchestrated and Russia-backed smear campaign; calls for the EU to increase financial support,

especially for Syrian civil society organisations as they adapt to shifting operating conditions, with a focus on

promoting civic dialogue, notably between ethnic, cultural and religious communities, to foster pluralism, peaceful

coexistence and trust within Syrian society;

8.

Stresses the importance of recognising the role of sexualised and gender-based violence in justice and accountability

processes, as well as of policies to ensure women’s full participation and representation in political life, as well as

their economic empowerment; calls, further, to address specifically the suffering inflicted on children;

9.

Is concerned by the exponential rise of disinformation originating both within Syria and from abroad; warns of the

risk of instrumentalisation of communities also by foreign actors; stresses the need for a pluralistic media landscape

to flourish and operate free of censorship and under a legally protected freedom of the press; calls for the EU and its

Member States to provide funding and capacity-building in this regard;

10.

Strongly believes that the success of the Syrian political transition, notably the safeguarding of civil peace and the

building of trust in state institutions, hinges on transitional justice and reconciliation as a path to fighting the

impunity of all parties responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses; calls

for judicial reform to be made an urgent political priority; encourages the caretaker Syrian Government to establish

an independent transitional justice committee to ensure accountability for past human rights violations committed

by all factions, emphasising that military unification cannot be achieved without a credible justice mechanism to

build trust among armed groups, including representatives from the southern factions, the SDF and former regime

officers;

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11.

Calls on caretaker authorities to fully cooperate with competent international instances, including UN mechanisms

established specifically for investigating serious crimes in Syria, such as the UN International, Impartial and

Independent Mechanism, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, the UN Independent Institution on Missing

Persons, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment, and facilitate their on-site operations; encourages Syria to ratify the Rome Statute of the International

Criminal Court (ICC) and align national legislation accordingly, as well as give the ICC retroactive jurisdiction

through a declaration; recognises the irreplaceable contribution of Fareed al-Madhhan (‘Caesar’) to documenting

regime crimes, as well as the Syrian Network of Human Rights’ work in tracking disappearances; stresses the

importance of these processes now being completed; calls for the EU to support the renewal of the mandate of the

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria and increase funding for all relevant mechanisms,

notably in light of US disinvestment;

12.

Commends the steps taken to fight impunity through universal jurisdiction cases in Germany, France and other

Member States, of individuals linked to the Assad regime and Daesh; encourages courts to continue such

prosecutions and expects newfound evidence and fruitful cooperation with Syrian authorities to lead to leaps in

investigations and convictions;

13.

Stresses the need for Syria’s transitional authorities to urgently take all steps to secure and preserve physical evidence

of serious international crimes across the country, including through cooperation and engagement with international

experts and current international mechanisms, and to grant all competent organisations access to archival

documents; encourages the EU to provide support for timely evidence collection on the ground, including forensic

equipment and expertise to identify and analyse mass graves, as well as the collection of survivors’ testimonies;

14.

Highlights that Syria is among the most heavily mine-contaminated countries; is alarmed by the rising number of

victims, including children, who have been killed or injured by mines and other explosives, a problem that is further

increasing as people start to return; commends efforts by international and local organisations in identifying,

marking and clearing explosive ordnance, and calls for the EU to urgently support demining efforts jointly with

specialised actors and Syrian authorities;

15.

Reiterates its strongest condemnation of the appalling use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians by the Assad

regime; welcomes the announcement by Syria’s interim government to destroy any remaining stockpiles of chemical

weapons in Syria and its openness to cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

16.

Appreciates the determination demonstrated by caretaker authorities in discontinuing the production and trafficking

of drugs, in particular Captagon, which have negatively affected the whole region for years; encourages international

cooperation against the trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings;

17.

Highlights the importance of protecting Syria’s cultural heritage and calls for international collaboration to restore

historical sites and religious landmarks and to prevent the illicit trade in looted artefacts; urges the EU to support

Syria in efforts to restore areas and places of cultural significance to the Syrian public and the world, including the

UNESCO site of Palmyra after its revolting partial destruction by Daesh in 2015;

18.

Acknowledges that the Syrian economy is shattered, with considerable investment gaps towards achieving price

stability and sustained job creation; calls for all necessary steps to be taken in order to incentivise and facilitate

foreign direct investment in accordance with international standards, as well as for reforms addressing housing, land

and property rights and policies balancing development across urban and rural areas to reduce regional disparities;

encourages economic disentanglement from Russia and Iran after both countries have profited from Syria’s

economic collapse to extract resources and control strategic industries;

19.

Welcomes the gradual and conditional suspension of sanctions on a range of economic sectors and the indefinite

extension of humanitarian exemptions; underlines that despite recent adjustments, the EU, US and UK sanctions

policies towards Syria are an obstacle to reconstruction efforts; calls on the Commission and the Council to reach

out to other countries imposing sanctions on Syria, notably the US and the UK; supports a full yet reversible lifting

of all sectoral sanctions, with a focus on the financial sector, so as to provide the Syrian economy a much-needed

lifeline, while closely monitoring the political transition process; expects over-compliance to remain an issue as long

as extensive US and UK sanctions remain in place, notably due to the former’s extraterritorial dimension; calls on the

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Commission and the Member States to provide European businesses and banks with legal assurances to counteract

over-compliance; calls, nevertheless, for individual sanctions against military personnel, officials, business entities

and individuals associated with the Assad family to be maintained; expects the yearly update of the EU sanction

regime ahead of its expiration on 1 June 2025 to adequately assess the relevance of all renewed sanctions, allowing

for much-needed clarity, and asks the European Council to define and clearly communicate clear steps that Syria’s

authorities must carry out, to secure further sanctions easing or prevent the activation of a snapback;

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20.

Welcomes the announcement by the Commission to allocate EUR 235 million in new humanitarian support to

Syrians and calls for the EU and its Member States to sustain humanitarian and development aid efforts and to

maintain financial support for neighbouring countries hosting Syrian refugees; invites the EU to explore pathways to

use frozen assets of the Assad regime for a trust fund for Syrian reconstruction, rehabilitation and compensation of

victims; is extremely concerned by the suspension of all USAID funding related to Syria or Syrian refugees and by

the foreseen non-participation of the US in the next Brussels conference;

21.

Calls for the EU to strategically extend its focus from humanitarian aid to accelerated and early economic recovery

and reconstruction in key sectors such as energy, water supply, healthcare and education, in order to reach tangible

results while ensuring that programming is accompanied by due diligence and independent monitoring; urges the

European Union and its Members States to agree on the joint provision of sustainable funding at the forthcoming

Ninth Brussels Conference;

22.

Welcomes the decision taken, for example, by France to allow refugees to return to Syria and participate in its

reconstruction without jeopardising their status, including for ‘go-and-see’ visits to Syria; calls on the Member States

and third countries to urgently replicate this initiative; calls on the Commission to encourage and provide the

Member States with guidance and best practice on the implementation of EU law on this issue, including as regards

the difference between ‘travel’ and ‘re-establishment’; insists that all asylum status claims and renewals must be

assessed individually and thoroughly; stresses the importance of balanced participation in the political transition

process of the Syrian diaspora as a key asset for the country’s transition and reconstruction; recognises the

importance of remittances alongside official development assistance and urges the Member States to lift any

restrictions placed on sending remittances to Syria; recalls, moreover, that according to the UN Refugee Convention,

conditions for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees can only be met following fundamental and durable

changes in Syria;

23.

Recalls the presence of over 400 000 Palestinian refugees residing in Syria, some of them displaced multiple times,

and the role of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in assisting its needs; remembers

the siege of the Yarmouk camp by Assadist factions between 2013 and 2015;

24.

Calls on Syria to break free from its notorious long-standing alliances with Tehran and Moscow, which have brought

suffering to the Syrian people and destabilisation to the Middle East and beyond; calls, further, on the caretaker Syrian

authorities to bring the Russian military presence in Syria to an end; condemns Russia for hosting Bashar al-Assad

and his family and shielding them from justice, after having obstructed justice by actively interfering in international

investigations and vetoing UN Security Council resolutions aimed at addressing the regime’s war crimes and

their own;

25.

Calls on neighbouring countries to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and to immediately cease all

attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law;

26.

Firmly believes that the unification of all segments of Syria, including the integration of all armed factions within a

national army, require a Syrian-led political solution; calls for the EU and the Member States to use all diplomatic

channels to advocate the stabilisation of Syria, which is in the interest of most countries in the region, and support

discussions towards a peaceful and stable solution and ensure that the well-being and preservation of fundamental

freedoms, economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the gender equality of all Syrians, notably those living in

north-eastern Syria, remain at the centre of decisions; welcomes, in this regard, the agreement of 10 March 2025

between de facto President al-Sharaa and SDF Commander in Chief Mazloum Abdi and hopes for its smooth

implementation; takes note of the positive result of recent negotiations between Kurdish armed groups in Türkiye

and the Turkish Government towards disarmament;

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27.

Insists that different ethnic and religious groups must be protected in order to create a peaceful Syria; therefore calls

for the European Union and the Member States to support the implementation process of the agreement between

the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF, in order to guarantee the Kurdish community full

recognition and political participation in Syria;

28.

Stresses the importance of the fight led by the international coalition against Daesh, with the invaluable support of

Kurdish fighters, and calls for it to cooperate with the Syrian interim government to prevent Daesh and other

jihadist groups from reorganising; expresses deep concerns as attacks led or supported by Türkiye in north-eastern

Syria not only cause civilian casualties and increase the number of internally displaced persons, but also threaten the

efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; urges the caretaker authorities to demonstrate clear commitment

to the fight against terrorism and to cooperate with international partners both to fight remaining active cells in Syria

and to investigate past crimes, notably against the Yazidi community;

29.

Urgently calls for a lasting solution to be found among all the parties concerned as these camps continue to be

breeding grounds for radicalisation and constitute a dormant threat to both Syrian and European security; warns

against the serious international security risk a sudden disengagement of the United States in the region would cause

in this uncertain context; reiterates its call on the Member States to repatriate all their nationals, especially children,

from Al-Hol and Roj and to bring adults to justice in fair trials;

30.

Calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cease all activities aimed at torpedoing the Syrian caretaker government’s

political and economic efforts and forcedly altering the status quo; commends the interim authorities for

intercepting Iranian weapon shipments destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon and welcomes the complete collapse of

Iran’s extensive infrastructure and networks in Syria;

31.

Welcomes de facto President al-Sharaa’s pledge to seek peaceful relations with all of Syria’s neighbours; calls on the

caretaker Syrian authorities to ensure this commitment is turned into concrete action to prevent and refrain from

taking any security-threatening measures against neighbouring countries and beyond;

32.

Condemns those European politicians, including current and former MEPs, who have repeatedly spread pro-Assad

narratives and actively engaged in whitewashing the bloody dictatorship; expresses deep concern regarding the

recent invitation by Parliament’s Intergroup on Christians in the Middle East of organisations closely linked to

EU-sanctioned Assadists;

33.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of

the Member States and the caretaker Syrian government, and to have it translated and published in Arabic.

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قرار من البرلمان الأوروبي حول ضرورة الدعم الأوروبي لانتقال عادل وإعادة إعمار سورية.