الذاكرة السورية هي ملك لكل السوريين. يستند عملنا إلى المعايير العلمية، وينبغي أن تكون المعلومات دقيقة وموثوقة، وألّا تكتسي أيّ صبغة أيديولوجية. أرسلوا إلينا تعليقاتكم لإثراء المحتوى.أرسل ملاحظة

NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR–GENERAL PROGRESS IN THE ELIMINATION OF THE SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME / EC-M-44/DG.1

NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR–GENERAL PROGRESS IN THE ELIMINATION OF THE SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME 1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter “the Council”) at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) reports to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. This is the tenth such monthly report. 2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities” (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation “in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1”. 3. This report is therefore submitted in accordance with both above-mentioned Council decisions and includes information relevant to their implementation during the period from 24 June to 24 July 2014. Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1 4. In accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic was required to complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014. As reported in the previous monthly report (EC-76/DG.14, dated 25 June 2014), the final shipment of declared chemicals identified for removal from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic took place on 23 June 2014. In addition, all declared stocks of the Category 1 chemical isopropanol have been destroyed within the Syrian Arab Republic. Progress achieved within the current reporting period by the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling other obligations is described below: (a) Intensive consultations have taken place relating to the destruction of aircraft hangars and underground structures at 12 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs). A technical meeting between representatives of the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United States of America, as well as representatives of the Secretariat, took place in Moscow EC-M-44/DG.1 page 2 from 26 to 28 June 2014. A technical meeting between the Secretariat and representatives of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic was also held in Beirut from 14 to 15 July 2014. As a result of these discussions and the progress that was made, the Council at its Forty-Third Meeting adopted a decision on the combined plans for the destruction and verification of 12 declared CWPFs in the Syrian Arab Republic (EC-M-43/DEC.1, dated 24 July 2014). The Council also noted a Note by the Director-General on the destruction and verification of these facilities (EC-M-43/DG.1/Rev.1, dated 21 July 2014), a Note by the Director-General on the combined destruction and verification plans for these facilities (EC-M-40/DG.2, dated 27 March 2014 and Add.1, dated 20 July 2014), as well as a national paper by the Syrian Arab Republic on the detailed destruction plan for these facilities (EC-M-40/P/NAT.2, dated 24 March 2014, and Add.1 and Add.2, both dated 20 July 2014); (b) On 14 July 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted a further amendment to its initial declaration submitted on 23 October 2013. In the amendment, the Syrian Arab Republic declared as a CWPF a facility for the production of ricin. The newly declared facility is subject to verification and destruction, although it is located in an area that is not under Syrian Government control. According to the amendment, the entire quantity of ricin produced was disposed of prior to the entry into force of the Convention for the Syrian Arab Republic. The amendment also includes information regarding two other chemical weapons-related facilities for research and development as well as Category 3 unfilled chemical munitions; (c) On 14 July 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic also submitted to the Secretariat a destruction plan for the two items declared by the Government as abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs) which, as verified by the Secretariat, contain the chemical agent sarin. The plan will be submitted to the Council for its approval in due course; (d) Pursuant to paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to submit a monthly report to the Council regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its chemical weapons and CWPFs. The eighth such report was submitted to the Secretariat on 18 July 2014 and made available to the Council (EC-M-43/P/NAT.1, dated 18 July 2014); and (e) In accordance with subparagraph 1(e) of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 7 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with all aspects of the implementation of the decision and the resolution. The Syrian authorities have continued to extend the necessary cooperation to the OPCW-UN Joint Mission (hereinafter “the Joint Mission”) in the conduct of its activities during the reporting period. Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities 5. Following the complete removal of identified chemicals from the Syrian Arab Republic on 23 June 2014, destruction activities are well under way. The following EC-M-44/DG.1 page 3 subparagraphs provide information on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons on board the United States vessel MV Cape Ray, at commercial facilities selected pursuant to paragraph 24 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, and at facilities sponsored by States Parties pursuant to paragraph 7 of decision EC-M-36/DEC.2 (dated 17 December 2013): (a) The MV Cape Ray arrived on 1 July 2014 at the Italian port of Gioia Tauro, where shipping containers holding the declared chemicals HD and DF were transloaded from the Danish cargo ship Ark Futura. The MV Cape Ray then proceeded to international waters in the Mediterranean on 2 July 2014. Destruction operations on board the MV Cape Ray began on 9 July 2014. An OPCW inspection team is on board the MV Cape Ray to verify the destruction and to ensure that it is in accordance with paragraph 8 and subparagraph 12(f) of EC-M-34/DEC.1. As at the cut-off date of this report, 22% of the DF has been verified as destroyed on board the MV Cape Ray. All liquid waste produced by the hydrolysis of DF was pumped directly into ISO tanks on the ship, pending further treatment at the Ekokem Riihimäki waste treatment and disposal facility in Finland, one of the two commercial facilities selected through the tender process organised by the OPCW; (b) As reported in the previous monthly report, the Ekokem Riihimäki facility in Finland received chemicals transported by the Norwegian cargo ship Taiko, following their offloading at the port of Hamina Kotka on 21 June 2014. The last consignment of four maritime shipping containers with chemicals was offloaded from the Ark Futura at the port of Hamina Kotka in Finland on 20 July 2014. As at the cut-off date of this report, 38% of the received chemicals have been destroyed by Ekokem in Finland, with one of the Category 1 chemicals received with the first delivery on 21 June 2014 having been completely destroyed; (c) Veolia ES Technical Solutions, LLC in the United States of America, the other commercial facility selected through the tender process organised by the OPCW, received the declared chemicals transported by the Taiko on 9 July 2014. Destruction activities began on 11 July 2014 and, as at the cut-off date of this report, 42% of the received chemicals have been destroyed by Veolia ES Technical Solutions, LLC; (d) Veolia Environmental Services (UK) in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland received declared chemicals transported from the Syrian Arab Republic by the Ark Futura on 15 and 16 July 2014. Because of the delayed removal from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic of the remaining hydrogen fluoride and hydrochloric acid, these chemicals could not be transported by the Norwegian cargo vessel Taiko to Veolia ES Technical Solutions, L.L.C., in the United States of America as originally intended. As a result, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland offered, through an in-kind contribution, to directly sponsor Veolia Environmental Services (UK) and Mexichem UK Limited to destroy the aforementioned remaining hydrochloric acid and hydrogen fluoride, respectively. This offer was formalised in an exchange of letters dated 8 July 2014 and, at its Seventy-Sixth Session, the Council considered and approved amendments and EC-M-44/DG.1 page 4 modifications to the original facility arrangement (EC-76/DEC.5, dated 11 July 2014). As at the cut-off date of this report, 4% of the received chemicals have been destroyed by Veolia Environmental Services (UK). Destruction activities at Mexichem UK Limited are planned for late 2014; (e) Once the neutralisation operation on board the MV Cape Ray has been completed, the vessel will deliver the HD effluent to the GEKA facility in Munster, Germany, and the DF effluent to Ekokem’s facility in Riihimäki, Finland, for disposal. 6. Taken together, the destruction activities described in subparagraphs 5(a) to 5(d) above mean that, as at the cut-off date of this report, 36.6% of the Category 1 chemicals and 12.4% of the Category 2 chemicals had been destroyed, representing a combined total of 32%, including the isopropanol previously destroyed in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat will continue to provide such information during briefings to States Parties in The Hague and through the monthly reports. Timelines for the completion of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons were provided in the overall report on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme (paragraph 25 of EC-76/DG.16, dated 4 July 2014), which was noted by the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session. Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic 7. Effective cooperation with the United Nations in the context of the Joint Mission has continued with close coordination between the two organisations and between the offices in The Hague, New York, Damascus, and Cyprus. The Director-General and the Special Coordinator of the Joint Mission, Ms Sigrid Kaag, have maintained regular contact. As at the cut-off date of this report, two OPCW staff members were deployed as part of the Joint Mission in Damascus, and one logistics officer in Beirut. 8. The Director-General has continued to meet with senior representatives of the States Parties hosting a destruction facility or otherwise providing assistance with transport or destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, and to communicate regularly with senior officials from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. As requested by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (paragraph 7.12 of EC-75/2, dated 7 March 2014), the Secretariat has continued to provide regular information briefings to States Parties in The Hague on behalf of the Director-General. 9. A team of four OPCW inspectors is permanently on board the MV Cape Ray as it neutralises HD and DF, and OPCW inspectors have carried out inspections at the commercial facilities to verify destruction activities. OPCW inspectors were also present when the Taiko delivered chemicals in Finland and in the United States of America, and when the Ark Futura delivered chemicals in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and in Finland. OPCW inspectors were also present in Gioia Tauro when declared chemicals were transloaded from the Ark Futura to the MV Cape Ray on 2 July 2014. The OPCW is receiving weekly updates on the progress of the destruction of Syrian chemicals weapons and, as instructed by the Council in paragraph 4 of decision EC-M-38/DEC.1 (dated 30 January 2014), reports on them through these monthly reports. In the interests of transparency, the OPCW is also reporting on the progress in destruction through its public website. EC-M-44/DG.1 page 5 10. The Secretariat briefed the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session on its ongoing consultations with the Syrian Arab Republic regarding its declaration and related disclosures. A team of experts from the Secretariat visited the Syrian Arab Republic from 30 June to 5 July 2014. Further details regarding the outcome of the most recent technical discussions are provided in subparagraph 4(b) above. The Council urged the Secretariat and the Syrian authorities to continue to cooperate through technical discussions on outstanding issues regarding the Syrian Arab Republic’s declaration, with a view to resolving as quickly as possible questions raised by the Secretariat to ensure the declaration’s accuracy and completeness. 11. During the reporting period, the Secretariat agreed upon amendments and modifications to the arrangement with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland governing on-site inspections at the Ellesmere Port High Temperature Incinerator and Marchwood Military Port, which was adopted by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (EC-75/DEC.3, dated 5 March 2014). As reported in subparagraph 5(d) above, the amendments and modifications were considered and approved by the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session. Supplementary resources 12. As at the cut-off date of this report, the total contribution received in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons stood at EUR 50.3 million. Contributions have been received from Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Finland, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This includes the contributions that were originally made to the first OPCW Trust Fund for Syria and which have, at the request of the donor, subsequently been transferred, in part or in whole, to the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons. Conclusion 13. The complete removal of the identified chemicals from the Syrian Arab Republic and the steady progress being made in their destruction are welcome developments, as is the Council’s decision on the issue of the destruction of the 12 remaining CWPFs. Destruction activities at those locations are expected to begin within two months’ time. The Secretariat will regularly report to the Council on the progress being made, together with recommendations for any adjustments in the destruction schedule, if necessary. 14. With regard to the Fact-Finding Mission to establish the facts surrounding the allegations of the use of toxic chemicals, reportedly chlorine, for hostile purposes in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council at its Seventy-Sixth Session underlined that the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances would be reprehensible and completely contrary to the legal norms and standards of the international community. The Council re-emphasised its unequivocal support for the Director-General’s decision to continue the Mission, while stressing that the safety and security of Mission personnel remains the top priority. 

المعلومات الأساسية

تاريخ الصدور

2014/07/25

البلد المستهدف

سورية

iranDocument

لا

رقم الوثيقة

EC-M-44/DG.1

المجموعات

OPCW منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية

نوع الوثيقة

تقرير

التصنيف الفرعي

تقرير أممي

اللغة

الإنجليزية

كود الذاكرة السورية

SMI/A200/557164

وثائق أخرى للجهة المصدرة

Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding the Incidents in Al-Hamadaniyah on 30 October 2016 and in Karm Al-Tarrab on 13 November 2016

نوع الوثيقة:

تقرير

الجهة المصدرة:

منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية

تاريخ الصدور:

2018/07/02

Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding Alleged Incidents in Ltamenah, the Syrian Arab Republic on 24 and 25 March 2017

نوع الوثيقة:

تقرير

الجهة المصدرة:

منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية

تاريخ الصدور:

2018/06/13

DECISION : Destruction of Twelve Chemical Weapons Production Facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic EC‑M‑42/DEC.3

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية

تاريخ الصدور:

2014/06/17

Note by the Technical Secretariat: Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding an Alleged Incident in Saraqib, Syrian Arab Republic on 4 February 2018 - Corrigendum S/1626/2018/Corr.1

نوع الوثيقة:

تقرير

الجهة المصدرة:

منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية

تاريخ الصدور:

2018/07/18

DECISION : Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities EC‑M‑34/DEC.1

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية

تاريخ الصدور:

2013/11/15

DECISION : Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons EC‑M‑42/DEC.1

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية

تاريخ الصدور:

2014/06/17

DECISION : Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria EC‑M‑48/DEC.1

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية

تاريخ الصدور:

2015/02/04

DECISION : OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Reports on Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic EC‑83/DEC.5

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية

تاريخ الصدور:

2016/11/11

DECISION : Combined Plan for Destruction and Verification of the “Al-Maliha” Ricin Production Facility in the Syrian Arab Republic EC‑M‑46/DEC.1

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية

تاريخ الصدور:

2014/11/19

DECISION : Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons EC‑M‑33/DEC.1

نوع الوثيقة:

قرار

الجهة المصدرة:

منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية

تاريخ الصدور:

2013/09/27

كيانات متعلقة

شخصيات مرتبطة

لايوجد معلومات حالية

يوميات مرتبطة

لايوجد معلومات حالية

درجة الموثوقية:

الوثيقة

  • صحيحة
  • غير صحيحة
  • لم يتم التأكد من صحتها
  • غير محدد