UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND STATEMENT BY H.E. AMBASSADOR PETER WILSON PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE OPCW AT THE FIFTY-EIGHTH MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND STATEMENT BY H.E. AMBASSADOR PETER WILSON PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE OPCW AT THE FIFTY-EIGHTH MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL Thank you Mr Chairperson, I am grateful to the Director-General for his update on the OPCW’s investigation into the horrific chemical weapons attack on 7 April in Douma, the Syrian Arab Republic. The Technical Secretariat has once again demonstrated the dedication and professionalism of its staff, willing to deploy promptly to Douma in dangerous circumstances. They have our full support and we look forward to their report. It is imperative that the Syrian Arab Republic and the Russian Federation offer the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) team their full cooperation and assistance to carry out their difficult task. This Executive Council has had to come together, yet again, to discuss another shocking violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the Syrian Arab Republic. Up to 75 people, including children, were killed in a despicable and barbaric attack in Douma on 7 April. The World Health Organisation has reported that 500 patients, seen by its partners in the Syrian Arab Republic, had symptoms consistent with chemical weapons exposure. The world has seen the harrowing images of men, women and children lying dead with foam in their mouths. These were innocent families who, at the time the chemical weapon was unleashed, were seeking shelter underground in basements. First-hand accounts from NGOs and aid workers have detailed burns to the eyes, suffocation and skin discolouration, with a chlorine-like odour surrounding the victims. As my Prime Minister said on 14 April, we are clear about who is responsible for the atrocity. A significant body of information, including intelligence, indicates the Syrian regime is responsible for this latest attack. Open source accounts allege a barrel bomb was used to deliver the chemicals, and a regime helicopter was seen above Douma on the evening of 7 April. The opposition does not operate helicopters or use barrel bombs. Reliable intelligence indicates that Syrian military officials coordinated what appears to be the use of chlorine in Douma on 7 April. No other group could have carried out this attack. As this Executive Council knows well, the Syrian regime has an abhorrent record of using chemical weapons against its own people. Chemical weapons use has become an all too EC-M-58/NAT.4 page 2 regular weapon of war in the Syrian conflict. The evidence is well known to this Executive Council: The OPCW has recorded more than 390 allegations of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic since the Fact-Finding Mission was established in 2014. The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism has found the Syrian Arab Republic responsible for using chemical weapons on four occasions between 2014 – 2017, including chlorine and sarin. The Syrian Arab Republic has not provided the OPCW with a complete account of its chemical weapons programme. The Director-General reported just last month that the Syrian Arab Republic had not provided credible evidence to account for 22 serious issues. This includes quantities of agent the Syrian Arab Republic possessed, the type of agent and the munitions used for delivery; Based on the persistent pattern of behaviour, and the cumulative analysis of specific incidents, we assess it as highly likely that the Syrian regime has continued to use chemical weapons since the attack on Khan Shaykhun a year ago. If unchecked, all of the evidence suggests that it would continue to do so. We and international partners have sought time and again to prevent the Assad regime from using chemical weapons against the Syrian people. Time and again when we have seen chemical weapons used in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Russian Federation has vetoed resolutions at the United Nations Security Council. The Russian Federation has vetoed six chemical weapons-related resolutions since the start of 2017, including a veto just last week of a draft resolution that would have established an independent investigation into the attack on Douma. The Russian Federation has argued that the attack on Douma was somehow staged, or faked. They have even suggested that the United Kingdom was behind the attack. That is ludicrous. The attack on Douma was not reported by just a sole source in opposition to the Regime. There are multiple eye witness accounts, substantial video footage, accounts from first responders and medical evidence. This Executive Council heard similar false claims from the Russian Federation and from the Syrian Arab Republic last year. They questioned the credibility of the evidence of a chemical weapons attack in Khan Shaykhun. Then they had to change their story once the Syrian Arab Republic itself had passed samples to the OPCW which the Syrian Arab Republic had already tested, and which proved that sarin had been used. Since 2016, the Russian Federation has sought to undermine every OPCW investigation into allegations of Regime chemical weapons use. Yet again, the Russian Federation is spreading conspiracy theories and misinformation designed to undermine the integrity of the OPCW’s FFM. The Russian Federation closed down the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism when it found that the Syrian Arab Republic was responsible for chemical weapons attacks. The Russian Federation has sought to block all action in this Executive Council and at the Security Council to hold the Syrian regime accountable for its actions. The Russian Federation’s activity have made further United Nations sponsored action untenable. EC-M-58/NAT.4 page 3 The United Kingdom, along with the United States of America and France, were clear that chemical weapons use could not continue to go unchallenged. The Syrian Arab Republic’s use of chemical weapons, which has exacerbated the human suffering in the Syrian Arab Republic, is a serious crime of international concern. It is a breach of the customary international law prohibition on the use of chemical weapons and amounts to a war crime and a crime against humanity. The military strikes we carried out on Friday night were specifically designed to degrade the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons capability and deter their use. The legal basis of humanitarian intervention was clear. This requires three conditions to be met: First, that there is convincing evidence of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale requiring immediate and urgent relief. Second, it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved. Third, the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian suffering. It must be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim. The objective of our military action was specifically the prevention of further use of chemical weapons in order to alleviate humanitarian suffering. It was not about interfering in a civil war. And it was not about regime change. Allies identified a specific and limited set of targets. They were: a chemical weapons storage and production facility; a key chemical weapons research centre; and a military bunker involved in chemical weapons attacks. Hitting these targets will significantly degrade the Syrian regime’s ability to research, develop and deploy chemical weapons. We have sought to use diplomatic channels over the past five years to stop chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic but our efforts have been repeatedly thwarted. The lack of accountability for the Khan Shaykhun sarin attack can only have reassured the Syrian regime that the international community was not serious in its stated commitment to uphold the norm against chemical weapons use, and to hold perpetrators to account. This is shameful. The choice for members of this Executive Council, and for all States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, is clear. Will we act to defend the Chemical Weapons Convention when its norms are so flagrantly violated by a Syrian Government using chemical weapons against its own people, over and over again? The Syrian Arab Republic and its handful of allies continue to obfuscate, filibuster, and lie. The time has come for all members of this Executive Council to take a stand. Too many duck EC-M-58/NAT.4 page 4 the responsibility that comes with being a member of this Council. Failure to act to hold perpetrators to account will only risk further barbaric use of chemical weapons, in the Syrian Arab Republic and beyond. Thank you Mr Chairperson.
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Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding the Incidents in Al-Hamadaniyah on 30 October 2016 and in Karm Al-Tarrab on 13 November 2016
نوع الوثيقة:
تقرير
الجهة المصدرة:
منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية
تاريخ الصدور:
2018/07/02
Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding Alleged Incidents in Ltamenah, the Syrian Arab Republic on 24 and 25 March 2017
نوع الوثيقة:
تقرير
الجهة المصدرة:
منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية
تاريخ الصدور:
2018/06/13
DECISION : Destruction of Twelve Chemical Weapons Production Facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic EC‑M‑42/DEC.3
نوع الوثيقة:
قرار
الجهة المصدرة:
منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية
تاريخ الصدور:
2014/06/17
Note by the Technical Secretariat: Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding an Alleged Incident in Saraqib, Syrian Arab Republic on 4 February 2018 - Corrigendum S/1626/2018/Corr.1
نوع الوثيقة:
تقرير
الجهة المصدرة:
منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية
تاريخ الصدور:
2018/07/18
DECISION : Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities EC‑M‑34/DEC.1
نوع الوثيقة:
قرار
الجهة المصدرة:
منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية
تاريخ الصدور:
2013/11/15
DECISION : Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons EC‑M‑42/DEC.1
نوع الوثيقة:
قرار
الجهة المصدرة:
منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية
تاريخ الصدور:
2014/06/17
DECISION : Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria EC‑M‑48/DEC.1
نوع الوثيقة:
قرار
الجهة المصدرة:
منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية
تاريخ الصدور:
2015/02/04
DECISION : OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Reports on Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic EC‑83/DEC.5
نوع الوثيقة:
قرار
الجهة المصدرة:
منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية
تاريخ الصدور:
2016/11/11
DECISION : Combined Plan for Destruction and Verification of the “Al-Maliha” Ricin Production Facility in the Syrian Arab Republic EC‑M‑46/DEC.1
نوع الوثيقة:
قرار
الجهة المصدرة:
منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية
تاريخ الصدور:
2014/11/19
DECISION : Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons EC‑M‑33/DEC.1
نوع الوثيقة:
قرار
الجهة المصدرة:
منظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية
تاريخ الصدور:
2013/09/27
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